

Copyright
by
Daryl Thomas Carr
2013

The Thesis Committee for Daryl Thomas Carr

Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

The Syrian Conflict in Lebanese Media

**APPROVED BY
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:**

Supervisor:

Karin Wilkins

Kamran Aghaie

The Syrian Conflict in Lebanese Media

by

Daryl Thomas Carr, B.A.

Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

Master of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2013

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, family, mentors, and friends who supported and encouraged me over the past three years.

Abstract

The Syrian Crisis in Lebanese Media

Daryl Thomas Carr M.A.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2013

Supervisor: Karin Wilkins

This thesis examines how three Lebanese satellite stations and two print journals cover the Syrian civil war. It is useful to analyze Lebanon's news programming because the relative lack of regulation over its media allows them to take drastically different political stances. Syria and Lebanon's unique political and cultural connection causes the conflict to permeate both the debates over foreign and domestic policy. My paper is significant because it elucidates the specific ways in which the Syrian crisis divides the already fractured Lebanese populace. My analysis reveals how regional news sources give meaning to the Arab Spring using language drawn from local historical and political experiences.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
A History of Lebanon's Media Since 1990.....	3
Sources for Data Analysis.....	5
Methodology.....	6
Chapter 1: Literary, Historical and Theoretical Context.....	10
Literature on Framing.....	10
Historical Context.....	13
The Nation and Media.....	15
Chapter 2: Nightly News Broadcasts.....	23
Coverage.....	24
Sources.....	25
Story Order.....	28
Framing of the Syrian Crisis.....	30
Integration of Narratives.....	32
Conclusion.....	37
Chapter 3: Syria in Lebanese Print Media.....	40
Framing.....	41
Portrayals of Key Actors.....	42
Changes in Coverage Over Time.....	51
Conclusion.....	52
Chapter 4: Political Conflict in Lebanese Media in 1978.....	53
The Black Friday Narrative in the Baghdad Observer.....	56
The Black Friday Narrative in an-Nahar.....	57
Brief Comparison of Narratives.....	58
The Camp David Negotiations.....	59
Rebellion in Rhodesia.....	62
Sandanistas.....	64
The Lebanese Civil War.....	64
Common Themes and Frames.....	66
Conclusion.....	68
Conclusion.....	69
Bibliography.....	72

Table of Tables

Table 1: Regional breakdown of news coverage	24
Table 2: Schedule from December 16 th broadcasts	29

Table of Figures

Figure 1: al-Manar's news coverage by region.....	33
Figure 2: LBC's news coverage by region.....	36
Figure 3: MTV's news coverage by region.....	38

Introduction

At various points in its history, Lebanon has been described alternatively as a failed nation, a failed nation-state, and a failed state. The literature on its history and politics is dominated by accounts of sectarian division,¹ an anemic state apparatus,² and geographic borders that have been respected by neither its neighbors nor its nationals.³ An enduring point of contention has been Lebanon's relationship with Syria. Accounts of Lebanon's founding emphasize the fact that when France and England assumed control of the former Ottoman territories, their diplomats drew Lebanon's borders with a concern primarily for creating a territory that would protect the interests of its Christian communities. As a result, some residents of the Syrian and Lebanese territories continue to question Lebanon's legitimacy as a country within the prevailing global discourse of the nation-state.

In this study, I look at the discourse in Lebanese media surrounding the Syrian crisis that began in 2011. For the purpose of this study, I have chosen to look at media produced within the geographic borders of Lebanon that possess a target audience that lives within those same boundaries. Though the research questions that I address relate closely to the concepts of national identity and nationalism, I am not aiming to treat Lebanon and Syria or even "Lebanese" and "Syrian" as points of identification that are internally consistent or mutually exclusive. As my analysis of "Lebanese" media suggests, each media source projects a shifting and inconsistent representation of what it means to be Syrian or Lebanese. In other words, the media sources not only conflict with each other over what these concepts encompass, but within a given media source, uses of these concepts contradict and bleed into each other. The building

¹ (Salibi 1988)

² (Harris, *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions* 1986)

³ (Mackey, *A Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict* 2008)

conflagration of Syria's civil war has thrown these concepts into sharp relief and motivated speakers to emphasize their differences.

My thesis contributes to theoretical approaches to Lebanon because I look at the ways in which news on Lebanon and Syria mitigate the Scyllas and Charibdises of the Lebanese discursive field, avoiding language that could alienate their target audiences while also attempting to maintain the narrative cohesion of their news coverage. To discuss how communities are imagined in the news without, at least, a brief mention of Benedict Anderson would be difficult. Though this project does look at the ways in which communities are imagined and re-imagined in a country's media, it does so with the intent of complicating the deterministic framework within which Anderson addressed this issue.

My approach also aims to rework the dualistic nature with which many theoretic approaches to nationalism consider a nation to be real or imagined and a nation-state project to be successful or unsuccessful.⁴⁵ In order to rework Anderson's conception of how the national identity is promoted in media, I introduce Slavoj Žižek's skepticism about the ability of a community to develop shared understandings of a concept's meaning. Žižek's approach to the "subject" is particularly useful and illuminating when applied to the construction of Lebanese identity, because he defines the *subject* as a negation that in trying to constitute itself is doomed to failure.⁶ Žižek considers this failure to be the inevitable result of any attempt to construct subjectivity, and Lebanon's history seems to adhere to his idea of the *subject* as negation.

My thesis contributes to academic work on media because there have been few comparative and detailed content analyses of media in Lebanon. It compares how various Lebanese print and television news sources cover the ongoing civil war in Syria. The historical,

⁴ (Chaitani 2007, 71)

⁵ (Gellner 1983, 133)

⁶ (Žižek 2005, 3)

cultural, and geographic links between the two countries cause the unrest in Syria to have major significance in Lebanese politics. These links also contribute to a polarizing effect within Lebanese society. As a result, Lebanon's diverse media sources portray news coming from Syria in starkly different ways. This topic is important because it both identifies Lebanese political schisms, and it shows how the conflict in Syria is affecting the political discourse in Lebanon.

My thesis first identifies the differences in coverage, and secondly, discusses potential reasons for these differences. My beginning hypothesis is that the divergence in coverage is closely linked to the media sources' political linkages and ownership. I am also beginning with the assumption that the news sources skew their coverage in a way that supports their positions on domestic issues.

A History of Lebanon's Media Since 1990

Since 1990, Lebanon has become a key player in the production of Arabic language media. In his book on reality television, Marwan Kraidy describes how Lebanese media talent plays a crucial role in media production flows of the Arab world.⁷ In an article on state regulation of television in Lebanon, Kraidy explains the important role that Lebanese news sources have played in informing not only Lebanese citizens but the Arab world in general. The Lebanese periodical *as-Safir*'s mantra captures this relationship: "Lebanon's news in the Arab world and the Arab world's news in Lebanon."

The early 1990's were characterized by government attempts to control media outlets in order to create stability after the chaos of the country's 15-year civil war. Between 1990 and 1993 the Lebanese government closed three television stations and several newspapers.⁸

⁷ (Kraidy, Reality Television and Arab Politics 2010)

⁸ (Kraidy, Broadcasting Regulation and Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon 1998, 488)

Originally founded by a Christian political party, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation maintained a tense relationship with the Lebanese government due to the station's critical stance with regard to Lebanon's relationship with Syria. The television station claimed that it was being targeted due to its Christian affiliation.⁹

In 1994 the National Council of Audio-Visual Media was established by the newly passed Audio-Visual law. The law established a categorization system for media outlets and set several regulations. A regulation that is extremely important for this paper is one that requires all television news bulletins to be objective and inclusive.¹⁰ This stipulation was used to prosecute and close stations that aired programming that the government felt was biased or inflammatory. In 1996, the government decided to close 56 television stations and reduced the number of officially sanctioned stations to four: Future, Murr Television, Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International, and The National Broadcasting Network.¹¹ Three of the stations were owned by top officials in the government representing different religious communities within Lebanon. The government allowed Future and LBCI to broadcast via satellite, but banned them from broadcasting news programming abroad. Al-Manar was given special permission to broadcast news about conflicts with Israel in 1996, and in 2000, it received governmental permission to broadcast via satellite.¹²

⁹ (Kraidy, *Broadcasting Regulation and Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon* 1998, 489)

¹⁰ (El Richani 2013, 73)

¹¹ (Kraidy, *Broadcasting Regulation and Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon* 1998, 489)

¹² (Sakr 2007, 8)

Sources for Data Analysis

My study focuses on five Lebanese media outlets. Three of the media sources will be news broadcasts that are archived on the websites of the Lebanese Broadcast Corporation (LBC), Murr Television (MTV), and al-Manar. LBC, the first private television station in Lebanon, was originally founded by members of the Christian rightists Lebanese Forces Party, but currently, Saudi Prince Bin Talal and Rupert Murdoch own a majority of the corporation. MTV was founded in 1991, but due to Syrian political intervention was forced to close between 2002 and 2009.¹³¹⁴ Al-Manar began broadcasting in 1991, but because of its affiliation with Hezbollah, it has been banned in several countries.¹⁵ It has the stated objective of opposing the Israeli occupation of Arab territories.¹⁶

The other two sources are the print versions of *al-Mustaqbal* and *As-Safir* that have been posted to the database *Library Pressdisplay*. *Al-Mustaqbal* is sponsored by Rafik Hariri's Future movement, and *as-Safir* has historically been associated with pan-Arab tendencies within Lebanon.

An-Nahar is a left-of-center periodical from Lebanon that was founded in 1933 by Gebran Tueni. During the time of the Iranian Revolution it operated with relatively little government supervision. Though the periodical focuses on local politics, it covers a large amount of international news. The paper is fairly open about its bias when it interprets events.

¹³ (El Richani 2013, 75)

¹⁴ (Sakr 2007, 43)

¹⁵ (Jorisch 2004)

¹⁶ (Jorisch 2004)

Jerusalem Post is an English-language periodical published in Israel. The paper had a slight leftist bias, and was originally published as the Palestine Post. The paper focuses on international news, and Arab-Israeli relations in particular.

The Baghdad Observer was an English daily published by the Iraqi government.

The strengths of my sources are that they are major sources of news for Lebanese citizens and they represent a wide array of ownership, political dispositions, and religious affiliations. The main weakness of my sources is that they are online and may not be available on a permanent or consistent basis.

Methodology

In this project, I look primarily at news produced for consumption within Lebanon, paying special attention to how the conflict in Syria is covered. I have done a content analysis of nightly news broadcasts from three of Lebanon's main media outlets. I also performed a similar analysis of two print sources. I paid attention to the total length of programs, the amount of time/space spent on Syrian news, the total number of stories presented, the number of stories related to Syria, the stories that are prioritized, the sources cited, the people interviewed, and the issues covered.

My study focuses on the broadcasts clustered around two significant periods in the course of the Syrian conflict. The first period is mid-December of 2012 when there was an increase in the level of violence within Syria and Bashar al-Assad issued arrest warrants for Lebanese politicians who supplied Syrian rebels with weapons. The second period was the second week in February 2013. The large time gap between the two samples is because during the viewing process some of the news broadcasts were removed from the television stations' websites.

To analyze the news coverage, I viewed over 600 minutes of news footage taking notes on story length, order, framing and subject. This footage represents 18 episodes of nightly broadcasts from al-Manar, LBC, and MTV collected from six different nights. I initially separated the stories into four categories based on their subject matter and setting: Lebanon, Syria, Arab World, and International. In deciding which news was specifically about the Syrian crisis, I used two main criteria: whether the story took place in Syria and whether it involved actors responding to the events there. After viewing the footage, a third category, which encompassed stories primarily about Lebanese actors' responses to the Syrian crisis became apparent.

My research on print media focused on how news articles related to Syria developed over the month of January. I looked at their length, position in the journal, their subject, how they framed the issue, and what sources were cited. I looked specifically at how these attributes changed or remained the same throughout the month.

The data for this section was collected from issues of *al-Mustaqbal* and *as-Safir* printed during the first two weeks of January 2013 and the first week of February of that same year. All of the articles related to the Syrian crisis printed during the month of January were collected and read for general tone. Next, all of the articles that dealt with Syria and appeared on the front page during the first two weeks of January were selected and analyzed in depth. An article was considered to be about Syria if one of the words in the headline was directly linked to Syria.

The analysis focused primarily on portrayals of the Syrian regime, opposition groups, civilians, refugees, and international actors. Attention was paid to how Lebanese and international actors were presented. Each time these groups were mentioned they were highlighted and then, the general context within which they were placed was analyzed to figure

out whether they were being portrayed positively or negatively. An attempt was also made to see what words were generally associated with a given group. In order to see how the story developed over time, all of the front-page articles about Syria from the first week of February were analyzed using this method. Articles were collected from two separate time periods in order to see if framing remained constant or shifted over time.

One major challenge in analyzing both the print and television media was conducting the research in Arabic. To reduce issues of translation as much as possible, most of the notes on the sources were recorded in Arabic using the same word choice as the source. This was particularly difficult with the broadcast sources because it was sometimes difficult to identify individual words due to the speed with which the speaker spoke. This was primarily a problem when reporters conducted street interviews. When a section was particular difficult to understand, native Arabic speakers were consulted.

The twin approach to my methodology enables me to examine different dimensions of how the Syrian conflict is covered in Lebanese news. By focusing on the nightly news broadcasts from a short time-period, I am able to examine how the conflict is situated among other news stories. This context reveals how the conflict in Syria is harmonized with the discourse surrounding other international events as well as domestic Lebanese issues.

Differences between how the television stations describe social movements in other Middle Eastern countries elucidate differences in the way that they cover the Syrian conflict. Also, the juxtaposition of stories about Syria with stories about domestic issues reveals convergence and disjuncture between how the stations conceptualize the relationship between Lebanese and Syrian politics.

My analysis of print media examines articles printed over the course of a month. This tactic enables me to compare how the discourse around Syria evolved in two papers with differing political orientations. While my analysis of the news broadcasts provides information about news about Syria is made to fit into the stations' broader discourse about world and domestic events, my analysis of print media shows how narratives are forged in an evolving process that must rationalize or ignore new events that seem to undermine their consistency.

In order to provide a broader context within which to think about coverage of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon, the third chapter steps back temporally and geographically by conducting a comparison between a Lebanese periodical and three other regional periodicals. It specifically looks at how protests in Iran were covered in 1978. This chapter provides the opportunity to discuss some of the characteristics of Lebanese media that seem to have remained constant over time. It also provides the opportunity to explore some of the aspects that distinguish coverage of the current Syrian conflict from coverage of other cases of civil unrest.

Chapter 1: Literary, Historical, and Theoretic Context

In this chapter I give a review of previous studies that have conducted content analyses of news sources, give a brief history of Syrian-Lebanese relations with a focus on the period after 2000, and discuss different ways of conceptualizing the Lebanese public sphere that could inform a study of its media.

Literature on Framing

In addition to analyzing the language and subject content of Lebanese news media I intend to analyze how news stories are framed. Dimitrova and Connolly-Ahearn define framing as “an organizing mechanism for media content,” that “provides an immediate context to the recipient of the frame through selection, emphasis or exclusion of specific facts or ideas.”¹⁷ This paper uses this definition as a base for its analysis.

One problem in doing a frame analysis is that authors often develop individual methodologies to suit their particular studies.¹⁸ Pan and Kosicki identify four structures that can be looked at during a frame analysis: Synthetic, Script, Thematic and Rhetoric. Synthetic structures represent word choice, Script structures refer to the evaluation of worthiness, thematic structures look at causal themes, and rhetorical structures represent the stylistic choices of a journalist. This framework is helpful in explaining the general categories that combine to form a frame, but is not very useful in identifying specific frames.

Gramson and Lasch, in their article on perceptions of Saddam Hussein’s trial describe some more specific elements that go into forming a frame when they give a non-exhaustive typology of seven such elements. The elements that they identify are Exemplars, Catchphrases, Depictions, and Roots. Exemplars are dramatized accounts that refer to past events, while

¹⁷ (Dimitrova and Colleen 2007, 155)

¹⁸ (Carragee and Roefs 2004, 216)

catchphrases are single words or brief statements that are used to refer to recurrent themes or ideas. An example of an Exemplar would be the use of the year 1982 in the context of Syrian. This year connects President Bashar Al-Assad's current repressive military actions to the much more extreme actions of his father during the Hama uprising. An example of a catchphrase would be the use of the term *fitna* to describe a pervasive fear that the social bonds will dissolve resulting in violent state of disorder. Depictions are symbols, metaphors and moral terms that become associated with the principle subject. An example of a Depiction would be the frequent use of the words "human suffering" which appeals to the moral obligation to protect innocents. Finally, Roots are descriptions that provide historical context that provide causal links for present events. These elements in combination determine the valence of a story or its overall tone, which is useful in determining the overall frame.

D'angelo develops specific types of frames that can be identified based on the content of stories.¹⁹ A few examples are Prognostic, Diagnostic, Anti-war, Media self-referential, and Responsibility frames. A Prognostic frame focuses on future effects, while Diagnostic frame focuses on the reasons leading to an event. A Media self-referential frame focuses on the role of the media in creating, sustaining, or ending a conflict. A Responsibility frame seeks to assign blame to the parties who are causing a problem or are failing to solve it.

This paper combines these methodologies by identifying the recurrent themes in Lebanese coverage of Syria, and using the elements identified by Pan and Kosicki to develop recurrent frames similar to those of Gramson and Lasch. It looks primarily at the content of new stories to find what their major themes are, and then identify which themes recur most frequently. It then compares the frequency of these themes across media outlets.

¹⁹ (D'Angelo 2002)

Relatively little academic research has been done on the content of Lebanese media. The two most detailed studies of Lebanese media are Marwan Kraidy's *Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life* and Katharina Notzold's *Defining the Nation?: Lebanese Media and Political Elites (1990-2005)*.²⁰²¹ Kraidy's work limited itself primarily to entertainment media of the Arab world, but dedicated a considerable amount of attention to Lebanese television. He theorizes that reality television has become a locus for the general public to become involved with debates about identity and representation.²² Notzold, on the other hand, presents a far more pessimistic picture implying that television news is an arena for political elites to present their view of the world.²³ In a book chapter on the same topic, she concludes "In fact, Lebanese news contributes little to shared experiences of people living in Lebanese society, and the current state of Lebanese news cannot have any integrative functions."²⁴ While Notzold's conclusion may have been true prior to 2005, it is helpful to ascertain the repercussions of the major political realignments that have taken place both after Syria's military withdrawal in 2005 and after the near collapse of the Syrian ruling regime over the past three years. My study is an important contribution to the field because there has been very little analysis of Lebanese media since the instability in Syria contributed to a fundamental change in the relationship between the Syrian and Lebanese governments.

²⁰ (Kraidy, *Reality Television and Arab Politics* 2010)

²¹ (Nötzold 2008)

²² (Kraidy, *Reality Television and Arab Politics* 2010)

²³ (Nötzold 2008)

²⁴ (Nötzold 2008, 140)

Historical Context

Lebanon as an independent political unit was first established in 1943 with the end of the French mandate. Its independence was never fully respected by successive regimes in Syria, and factions within Lebanon showed varying degrees of support to the Lebanese states apparatus. Internal instability in combination with Syrian pressure allowed Palestinian militants to gain numbers and influence within Lebanon.²⁵ A failed attempt by the Lebanese army to neutralize the military wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization led Christian groups to begin organizing their own militias.²⁶ Soon, the Lebanese government was paralyzed by trying to maintain the participation of factions whose interests could not be reconciled. As a result of the state's incapacity, paramilitary groups increasingly engaged in violent acts that frequently resulted in civilian death. By 1976, Lebanon was in a civil war that would last 15 years.

The Lebanese Civil War was ended in 1990 when the Syrian army gained primacy in the territory. The Syrian President, Hafiz al-Assad, ruled Lebanon from Damascus with tacit US approval. Assad considered Lebanon and Syria to be "one people with two states."²⁷ A unity government constructed by Syria supervised the disarming of Lebanese militias. The government structure was based on the permanently allotting certain sects certain governmental positions. The president would always be Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni, and the Speaker of the Parliament Shi'i. Due to a financial crisis in 1992, Syria reluctantly allowed Rafiq Hariri to become prime minister because of his connections to Saudi financial backers. As prime minister, Hariri's relationship with Assad and other members of the Lebanese government remained tepid.

²⁵ (Harris, Lebanon: A History 2012, 224)

²⁶ (Harris, Lebanon: A History 2012, 226)

²⁷ (Harris, Lebanon: A History 2012, 258)

When Bashar al-Assad began to manage Lebanese affairs in late 1998, he engaged in a failed maneuver to push Hariri out of government.²⁸

2000 was a year of transition for Lebanon because Hafiz al-Assad died less than a month after Israel withdrew from the “Security Zone” it had occupied during the civil war in southern Lebanon. Israel’s withdrawal allowed for Hezbollah to expand its influence in the region. Bashar al-Assad’s ascension to the presidency also upset the balance of power within Lebanon as local politicians adjusted to his more intrusive style of governing.²⁹ Power relations with various Lebanese actors never stabilized, and Hariri cooperated with Druze leader Walid Junblat to oppose Syrian influence. They were upset with what they saw as the Lebanese state apparatus acting as an increasingly intrusive extension of Assad’s regime. Until 2003, the US was complicit with regards to Syrian-Lebanese relations, but after antagonism between US President George W. Bush and Bashar al-Assad increased due to the Iraq war, the US and the UN began to pressure Syrian to withdraw its army from Lebanon. In September of 2004, this pressure culminated with UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for a withdrawal of Syrian troops. On February 2, a group of opposition Lebanese politicians, covertly organized by Hariri, passed legislation officially calling for Syrian withdrawal. Less than two weeks later, Hariri died in a car bomb.

The Hariri assassination launched a series of Christian protests leading to the resignation of the Assad supported Prime Minister on February 28. On March 8, about 500,000 pro-Syrian Lebanese citizens organized a protest.³⁰ In response to this large show of support for Syria, Christians, Sunnis, and Druze organized a protest of 1 million on March 14. The massive show

²⁸ (Harris, Lebanon: A History 2012, 263)

²⁹ (Harris, Lebanon: A History 2012, 265)

³⁰ (Harris, Lebanon: A History 2012, 269)

of antagonism allowed the US to increase its pressure, and Syria withdrew the last of its forces on April 26.

In elections that took place after the Syrian withdrawal political coalitions took the names of the two large protests that occurred after Hariri's death. The predominantly Shi'i supporters of Syrian influence became the March 8 alliance while the Christian-Sunni-Druze alliance became known as the March 14 alliance. The latter won a majority in elections, but politics proved unstable, and Michel Aoun's Christian group, the Free Patriot Movement, eventually defected from March 14 to join March 8.

Asserting its independence vis-à-vis the Lebanese state and its courage vis-à-vis Israel, Hezbollah crossed the Israeli border and abducted two Israeli soldiers. This sparked a five-week series of retaliations between the Israeli government and Hezbollah, which resulted in massive destruction to Lebanese infrastructure in the country's southern border. Political conflicts between March 8 and March 14 continued to increase until the majority of March 8 politicians that were a part of the government withdrew in protest of March 14's support of an international tribunal to prosecute those responsible for Rafiq Hariri's death in 2006. March 14's control over government became even more tenuous when Junblat and his followers ended their support for March 14 in 2010. Since the outbreak of fighting in Syria, the political process in Lebanon has continued to be characterized by deadlock. The most recent debate that political parties were deciding was whether to have elections or write new election laws first.

The Nation and Media

While Benedict Anderson looked primarily at the ways in which states used bounded language communities to promote imagined national communities, my analysis reveals the ways

in which language is as much a wedge that divides people who ascribe to Syrian and Lebanese identities as it is a factor that unites them. Anderson (1983) writes, “What the eye is to the lover – that particular, ordinary eye he or she is born with – language – whatever language history has made his or her mother-tongue – is to the patriot.”³¹ Anderson’s ideas resemble the pan-Arab ideals of Nasser and some of his predecessors,³²³³ but recent history has seen pan-Arab movements all but lose their former ebullience.³⁴ Today, the Arabic language remains a factor that unites diverse communities within Lebanon to each other as much as it unites communities in Lebanon to the larger Arab world. Arabic creates the potential for a single and exclusive national identity that includes people living with the territories of Lebanon and Syria, but in no way dictates its success. My study shows how media diversity allows for different imaginings of national identities to coexist simultaneously within a single language community and reflects some of the Slavoj Zizek’s assertions about identity.³⁵

In studies of identity in the Middle East it has also become popular to look at the ways in which state structures have attempted to “create” national identities that did not exist previously, but the combination of weak state institutions and strong familial ties cause Lebanon not to adhere to this conceptualization of state consolidation and nation formation. Fred Halliday and other authors have referred to this as the “incubator” model where states create the bureaucratic and geographic frames of reference within which a national identity can be developed.³⁶³⁷ Much work has been done on how the process developed in Jordan, Syria, and Turkey.³⁸³⁹⁴⁰⁴¹ In

³¹ (Anderson 1983, 140)

³² (Zeine 1958, 13)

³³ (Anderson 1983)

³⁴ (Chaitani 2007, 112)

³⁵ (Zizek 2005, 76)

³⁶ (Halliday 2000)

³⁷ (Gellner 1983)

³⁸ (Gelvin 1998)

³⁹ (Hinnebusch, Syria: Revolution From Above 2001)

general these processes agree with what Anderson described as the state's use of "official nationalism" to promote the state first and foremost.⁴² Lebanon, however, is usually characterized as being an outlier in the region.

Literature on Lebanon emphasizes the relatively limited success of the Lebanese government to build institutions that scholars studying nationalism have traditionally viewed as being instrumental in the promotion of a national identity. They emphasize Lebanon's weak official army, the government's limited provision of public goods, and its devolution of family law to religious communities.⁴³ While I recognize the relatively limited role that the central government plays in promoting a unified conception of national identity, my analysis reveals how the imagined communities that are promoted in media must act in dialog with the presence of a Lebanese state and political arena. The state may not play the primary role in defining and promoting a national identity, and efforts to define national identity may be plural and contradictory, but there exists a consensus that Lebanon as an entity exists as a point (among others) of identification for its citizens.

Taking an Andersonian approach, the plurality characteristic of Lebanon is maintained by the fractured nature of the media sector. Until the state attempted to reform the market in 1996, there were over 60 privately owned television stations broadcasting from the country.⁴⁴ The state reduced this number and instituted restrictions on the type of content that stations could air, but the control exercised by the Lebanese state over its media sector is negligible in comparison to other states in the Middle East. The lack of a single official media outlet means that contrary to Benedict Anderson's model, there was little opportunity for the state to promote an official

⁴⁰ (Nowar 2006)

⁴¹ (Haddad 1985)

⁴² (Anderson 1983)

⁴³ (Harris, *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions* 1986, 27)

⁴⁴ (Kraidy, *Broadcasting Regulation and Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon* 1998)

state nationalism.⁴⁵ As a result, multiple definitions of Lebanon could persist and become engrained in the citizenry. That the rights to own broadcast stations was distributed by the government in a semi-confessional manner further aided this process as the leading politicians created media outlets with programming that targeted their constituencies and reaffirmed their differing visions for Lebanon.⁴⁶

Slavoj Žižek's insights into the nature of identity and the subject can help explain why the Syrian-imposed internal peace has remained relatively stable since 1990. In his attempt to synthesize the ideas of Georg Hegel and Jacques Lacan with those of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Žižek asserts a purely empty, negative conception of identity. Borrowing from Laclau and Mouffe, he denies that the *subject* is "an essential entity, given in advance, dominating the social process."⁴⁷ He agrees with them that there are available different "subject-positions," which have no preexisting or fixed meaning and are continually in a process of definition in relation to the shifting meanings of every other "subject-position" around them. Žižek then tries to harmonize this negative conception of the *subject* with Hegel's dialectic. He concludes that the perceived antagonism between the *self* and the *other*, which is often perceived as being essential, is really just a projection by the *self/subject* onto the *other* generated by the *self's* inability to constitute itself into the identity it believes it truly should be.

If we use Žižek's conception of the *subject* in theorizing the process of forming collective identities in Lebanon, we understand that "Lebanese," like all national identities, is an empty subjectivity. The antagonism that nations express or perceive towards other nations is really just an externalization of the insecurity they feel with respect to their own inability to fully constitute themselves into the ideal that they believe they should be. The relatively non-intrusive nature of

⁴⁵ (El Richani 2013)

⁴⁶ (Nötzold 2008)

⁴⁷ (Žižek 2005, 250)

Hafiz al-Assad's rule in Lebanon allowed for this antagonism to resolve itself differently in the various media outlets. There was less of a need for a shared public debate/conclusion about whether Lebanon was a Syrian territory; an independent state of Arabs; a Lebanese nation-state; or a multi-cultural autonomous polity. The increased intrusion of Bashar al-Assad's presidency brought these debates to the foreground because Lebanese citizens could not agree on whether his actions were legitimate. This phenomenon resembles how Ottoman efforts at administrative reform during the beginning of the 20th century were a catalyst for Arab nationalist movements to become more active.⁴⁸⁴⁹ The potential dissolution of the Syrian state due to the ongoing civil war also poses a threat to the precarious balance between differing conceptions of the Lebanese identity.

In many Arab countries, the social movements of the Arab Spring have been characterized by a breakdown of the top-down approach to defining the nation. Aided by the proliferation of digital media, average citizens now generate and distribute media quickly to audiences of unprecedented sizes.⁵⁰ This has created a discursive space where citizens in formerly repressive societies can talk not only to each other but also back to their repressive governments. In *Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life*, Kraidy describes the Lebanese protests of 2005 as a moment where new media enabled and inspired Lebanese citizens to become active participants in determining the course of their society.⁵¹ In his opinion, it was a constitutive moment when Lebanese citizens formed associations in order to advocate for what they believed to be the proper relationship between their government and the Syrian regime. He sees the participants' displays of the Lebanese flag during protests as acts that

⁴⁸ (Hayali 1997, 20)

⁴⁹ (Zeine 1958, 150)

⁵⁰ (Lynch 1999)

⁵¹ (Kraidy, *Reality Television and Arab Politics* 2010)

allowed them to claim simultaneously loyalty to the Lebanese entity and a stake in determining its nature. Kraidy takes up the term “Independence Intifadah” and compares it to how Palestinians displayed a more generalized sense of responsibility for opposing the Israeli occupation.

Ersun Kurtulus expresses a different opinion in the article “‘Cedar Revolution’: Lebanese Independence and the Question of Collective Self-Determination.” Kurtulus asserts that the protests were neither a revolution nor akin to the Palestinian intifadahs, because they resulted in a system that resembled the preexisting power arrangement more than it differed from it.⁵² According to the article, the protests were less an expression of Lebanese unity than expressions of the fractious nature of identity politics in Lebanon. He sees the protests as a failure of the Lebanese public sphere to advance the dispute over the definition of Lebanon’s status. In describing the split in the Lebanese polity, he uses the term “independence-integration cleavage.”⁵³ He asserts that the series of protests and resulting political alliances only deepened preexisting divisions between pro-Syria and pro-Lebanon factions.

Both authors mischaracterize the significance of the March protest movements. Kurtulus underestimates the significance that participants in both protest movements were disagreeing over what was in Lebanon’s best interest, and felt as though it was their right as citizens to express that opinion publically. Kraidy overstates the depth of the changes that the protest movements embodied.

In *Interrogating the Real*, Slavoj Zizek (2005) asserts that the type of public sphere that both Kraidy and Kurtulus have in mind is impossible. According to Zizek both scholars seem to be assuming the potentiality of a “smooth communication” where the subjects “effectively mean

⁵² (Kurtulus 2009, 206)

⁵³ (Kurtulus 2009, 209)

the same thing.”⁵⁴ He claims that this is impossible and undesirable because it hinges on a falsity: “presenting what we should strive for as already accomplished.” March 14 was assuming that an independent entity, Lebanon, was being unfairly oppressed by Syria. March 8 was assuming that Lebanon and Syria were already fused, and they were trying to prevent it from being severed. The success of the protests, as Kraidy properly identifies, is that both movements embraced the symbol of the Lebanese flag, and by extension a claim to determine what it means to be Lebanese. The failure, that Kurtulus mistakenly identifies as being the public sphere’s, is that both groups act as though the “Lebanon” they imagine is already in existence and that the other group wishes to destroy it or continue its suppression. A true failure of the public sphere as defined by Kurtulus would have required that March 8 deny the existence of Lebanon and recognize only the Syrian identity.

Whether or not Lebanese citizens adopt a consistently defined Lebanese national identity, they participate in a public sphere that is largely fixed by overlapping Lebanese political and economic arenas.⁵⁵ Participation in this public sphere often requires even reluctant participants to acknowledge membership to a Lebanese polis that is somehow distinct from external groups. I suggest that debates over whether Lebanon is an authentic nation or a successful nation-state obscure the ways in which it has become a community of solidarity for its members. While groups of Lebanese citizens may dispute the characteristics that define Lebanon as a community, they participate in that debate as a bounded community.

The conflicts in Syria as well as the peaceful social movements developing in the Middle East have made the media’s distinction between Lebanon and non-Lebanon more palpable. The need for a shared definition of Lebanon is becoming more urgent as Syria seems increasingly

⁵⁴ (Zizek 2005, 223)

⁵⁵ (Chaitani 2007)

posed for collapse. Though shared demands for democratic opening and ending corruption unite citizens in Middle Eastern countries, most of these campaigns are being waged on the national scale using national symbols. Politics in the Middle East are reconceiving existing state formations by reappropriating national discourse and infusing it with new ideals and priorities. This process is similar to the use of symbols to encourage and forge national identity that James Gelvin described in his book, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*.⁵⁶ Similar to the Syrian elites that were trying to promote Arab and Syrian identities during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, social movements in the Middle East are using shared national symbols to promote unity.

The language of the Arab Spring has infiltrated the Lebanese public sphere as well. Lebanese institutions are receiving greater recognition from groups that were typically suspect of it. Traditionally pro-Syrian news outlets resort to using language that acknowledges both the threat posed by external instability and the need for cooperation among Lebanon's diverse political and cultural factions in order to avoid contagion. This poses a danger as now, unlike the days of Hafiz al-Assad, a shared agreement on the process for defining "Lebanon" may be a necessity for stability and in order to persist as a state.

⁵⁶ (Gelvin 1998)

Chapter 2: Nightly News Broadcasts

In this section I analyze the content of nightly news broadcasts from three Lebanese television stations. These stations' nightly news broadcasts are a useful source of information because they represent each station's effort to condense an entire day's news cycle into a single 30 to 45-minute program. In doing so, the producers make decisions as to which stories will receive coverage and how much coverage they will receive. Additionally, the stories' arrangement within the program is reflective of how producers perceive both the logical connections between them as well as their importance relative to each other. These traits make a comparison between the nightly news broadcasts produced by different stations indicative of the different ways that Lebanese citizens can integrate world events into broader narratives.

I begin my analysis by looking at the amount and nature of coverage that each station assigned to the Syrian crisis. I answer the question of how much time is dedicated to news related to Lebanon, Syria, and international affairs. I then look at the typical sources and interviews used in the stations' news stories, and discuss the effect these choices have on the types of narratives that can be constructed. Next, I attempt to answer the question how the stations prioritize the news by analyzing the order of stories in their broadcasts. I then attempt to answer the question of how the stations frame the situation in Syria by looking at the primary issues related to the conflict that they cover. I conclude the section by taking a close reading of purposively selected broadcasts from each station that seem to embody not only the way in which each station portrays the events in Syria but also how these portrayals of the Syrian crisis are integrated into the larger context of domestic and foreign events.

Coverage

Once the news coverage was broken into these categories, I calculated that based on the number of minutes allotted, about 20% of MTV's coverage was related to Syria, 27% of LBC's coverage was related to Syria, and 35% of al-Manar's coverage related to Syria. The most striking fact revealed by analyzing the amount of time dedicated to various geographic areas is that very little of al-Manar's news stories were related to Lebanon. Several of the broadcasts made no overt reference to Lebanon's existence. Additionally, almost all of the news that was not about Syria was related other Arab-majority states. In contrast, 39% of LBC's coverage and 57% of MTV's coverage was related to Lebanon. In the table below, some stories were counted more than once due to their content straddling categories.

Table 1: Regional breakdown of news coverage

	MTV	LBC	al-Manar
News Related to Syria	20%	27%	35%
News Related to Lebanon	57%	39%	6%
News Related to Both Syria and Lebanon	15%	9%	2%
News Related to other Arab countries	6%	17%	60%
News about non-Arab countries	32%	29%	2%
N	230 minutes (6 Broadcasts)	160 minutes (6 Broadcasts)	240 minutes (6 Broadcasts)

What is most striking about these figures is the difference in relative importance that Syria and Lebanon play in MTV's and LBC's coverage. The difference between MTV's coverage of Lebanon and its coverage of Syria is 37% while that same figure for LBC is only 12%. Additionally, only 5% of MTV's coverage is dedicated stories that relate only to Syria at the exclusion of Lebanon while nearly 18% of LBC's stories relate exclusively to Syria. These figures seem to suggest that Syria receives greater priority in *LBC's* coverage while MTV focusses more on Lebanese news. It also interesting to note the near opposite ratios that *MTV* and al-Manar possess in relation to the amount of time they spend on Lebanon versus the rest of the Arab world.

Sources

All of the stations reference a diverse array of sources when presenting stories, but each one uses different concentrations of types of sources. I categorized the types of sources based primarily on the organizations that they represent. The major types of sources that I identify are unofficial eye-witnesses, political figures, religious figures, reports from non-governmental organizations, and interviews with experts. I defined unofficial eye-witnesses as civilians who were representing an organization. I defined political figures are current and former members of government or members of political parties. I defined religious figures are people with a leadership role within a religion. I defined experts as people portrayed as analysts, academics, or researchers in the caption below their name. A few broad patterns present themselves once the sources that the stations use are divided into categories.

Generally speaking and especially with regard to their coverage of Syria, all three of the stations used unofficial eye-witness accounts sparingly. LBC and al-Manar used eye-witness

accounts the most heavily, and they both used them most frequently when reporting on the Egyptian constitutional referendum. LBC employed civilian accounts also when relating news from Lebanese municipalities.

Eye-witness accounts were used most frequently to assert the existence of multiple points of view to a given event. Particularly, interviews with Egyptians were used to present the contested nature of the new constitution while also emphasizing the democratic process at work. In contrast, when LBC and MTV employed eye-witness accounts, they used them mainly to humanize stories of civilian suffering. Contrastingly, al-Manar used civilian accounts in order to illustrate efforts by the Syrian government to ease suffering caused by armed rebel groups. All three of the stations routinely edited footage of eye witnesses to an extent that the context for their comments was determined predominantly by the newscaster's commentary.

Both LBC and MTV frequently referenced Lebanese political figures in their stories on Syrian and international events. The main difference between LBC and MTV's use of Lebanese political figures is that MTV tended to give more time to figures that held no official government post, while LBC focused more on government ministers and representatives. The only Lebanese figure mentioned with any regularity on al-Manar was Sayed Hussein Nasrallah.

LBC and al-Manar frequently feature quotes from international sources. Figures were commonly United Nations representatives, other nations' foreign ministers, or civil society representatives. MTV referenced relatively few international sources, but when it did, they were usually UN representatives.

More than either of the other two stations, al-Manar employed experts to analyze news events. These segments would usually follow a customary news story and consisted of the newscaster interviewing the expert for five to ten minutes about the topic at hand. The experts

were frequently researchers from foreign institutes, political analysts, or foreign political figures. This format was a sharp contrast to the other nightly broadcasts, which relied on a choppy pastiche style of incorporating primary sources into the news.

A last type of news source included religious figures. Al-Manar used religious figures as sources with the least frequency while MTV often referenced quotes by Christian religious figures. However, when covering Egypt or other Middle Eastern countries, al-Manar would frequently quote political figures associated with Islamist parties. Both LBC and MTV employed quotes from religious leaders to frame domestic and international political problems.

The sources that the stations relied upon had a strong influence over the ways in which stories were covered. MTV's reliance on religious figures and politicians without formal government positions caused most of their coverage to be slightly critical of the current government. LBC's greater reliance on politicians that held positions as ministers caused their coverage to be less critical of the government. Both stations tended to emphasize the Christian aspects of Lebanese culture while underrepresenting Muslim aspects of it. Al-Manar's near complete use of foreign sources made the Lebanese state almost invisible, and its use of experts tended to narrow interpretations of news stories. Experts would often quote other sources presented in the story, but re-contextualized statements to an extent that made it seem like they in fact proved the opposite of their surface meaning. The three stations used drastically different techniques for presenting the sources used in their news coverage.

With regard to their coverage of Syria, the stations sources had a strong influence on how the stories were constructed. MTV frequently framed the stories using commentary from Lebanese or international observers with sparing use of Syrian voices. As a result of this use of sources, the Syrian crisis feels less immediate and more distant. The only sense of immediacy is

when MTV covers the Lebanese government's response to the influx of refugees, and includes their statements about fears that instability will spread to Lebanese society.

In contrast, LBC and MTV tended to use more statements issued by groups within Syria. The two stations differed in terms of what sources they most frequently employed. LBC frequently repeated statements by both opposition and regime figures, while al-Manar limited its quotations to official statements from Syrian figures. Al-Manar also included statements from organizations that represent Syria's civil society that frequently detailed their productive cooperation with the government to meet the needs of Syria citizens. In contrast, MTV more frequently interviewed average citizens complaining about the depravations that they were suffering. LBC frequently showed refugees who had fled to Lebanon, but al-Manar ignored the influx of refugees with only a few exceptions. The three stations' coverage of Syria was limited by the types of sources that they chose to use.

Story Order

Looking at the stories presented and their ordering also reveals some of the divergence in the way the stations cover the news. LBC tended to have the largest amount of news coverage that overlapped with the other two stations. While comparing MTV and al-Manar reveals that MTV occasionally covers stories that al-Manar does not. These stories usually related to Lebanese Christian figures. Two examples of stories that were placed in the first position of MTV's broadcast but were not covered by al-Manar are one that detailed the election of a new Orthodox Patriarch and another that focused on Michel Aoun talking about the need for new elections in Lebanon. In contrast, al-Manar frequently led its broadcasts with stories from other Middle Eastern countries. These countries commonly included Iraq, Egypt, and Tunisia. Stories

about Iraq received lots of coverage by al-Manar, but MTV dedicated significantly less time to these stories. LBC usually gave its lead slot to covering Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, or local events.

The stations also showed diversity in position that they placed stories about Syria. In general, MTV gave Syria lead positions least frequently, and stories covering Syria were often extremely short. LBC, on the other hand, would frequently place Syria second in the bulletin's ordering and occasionally first. LBC's stories on Syria were of similar length to MTV's stories, but slightly longer. Though Syria was one of al-Manar's lead stories less frequently than on LBC, al-Manar always dedicated two or more stories to covering different aspects of the Syrian conflict. These stories would usually be placed in succession, and would either start with an on-the-ground view of the events periscoping out to the international community's response or take the opposite approach. Looking at the ordering of the stories in each station's broadcast reveals the different priority levels that they assigned the Syrian crisis.

Table 2: Schedule from December 16th broadcasts

Story Position	MTV	LBC	al-Manar
1	Michel Aoun's Stance on new election law	Developments in Syria	Jalal Talabani's Health
2	Prime Minister Mikati	Opposition to Egyptian constitution	Car bomb in Karbala
3	Election law	Jala Talabani's Health	Bombing of Iranian Tourists in Iraq
4	Lebanon's President meets with new Patriarch	Local news from municipalities	Attack on Palestinian camp in Syria
5	Activities of President Suleiman cont.	Activities of Prime Minister Mikat and President Suleiman	Patriot Missiles in Turkey

Table 2: Continued

6	Michel Aoun	Fights on college campus	Damascus gives aid to Aleppo
7	Hassan Nasrallah is responsible for condition of country	Immigrants to Lebanon and their inability to access health care	Egyptian constitution
8	Tourism in Lebanon	Charity foundation's history	Israeli settlements in Palestine
9	Inefficient bidding process for public works project	Economics	Protests in Tunisia
10	Egyptian protests	Sports	-
11	Syrian crisis	Weather	-
12	Comments by Akab Saqr	-	-
13	Attacks at college in Lebanon	-	-
14	Church unable to continue charitable activity due to lack of funds	-	-
15	Official dinner for March 14 th Alliance	-	-
16	MTV wins best economic report	-	-
17	Lebanese Cinema	-	-
18	Christmas celebrations	-	-

Table 2: Continued

19	Jala Talabani's health	-	-
20	Foreign News	-	-
21	Economy	-	-
22	Sports	-	-
23	Weather	-	-

Framing of the Syrian Crisis

The Syrian crisis' complexity causes it to be open to several different interpretations and allows for news channels to cover it from several different angles. Each of the stations tended to emphasize slightly different aspects of the crisis. LBC and MTV used the most similar framing techniques, while al-Manar employed the most idiosyncratic frame.

MTV most frequently talked about the Syrian crisis from a humanitarian perspective. More specifically, it frequently covered how the Lebanese government was absorbing large numbers of displaced Syrians. It focused primarily on how violent conflicts between opposition forces and the government had stalled the economy and destroyed infrastructure. The crisis was framed as a humanitarian crisis that required international intervention to stop civilian suffering. The report from December 16, 2012 described the situation saying:

وبالعكس وتيرة دبلوماسية الدولية البطيئة جدا بسبب إلى الملف السوري الدموي فوتيرة المعارك والاشتباكات سريعة جدا
وحصلتها عشرات القتل يوميا

In contrast to the very slow pace of international diplomacy with regards to the bloody case of Syria, the pace of the battles and clashes in Syria is very quick and results in dozens of deaths a day.⁵⁷

This characterization of the situation forefronts how the glacial pace of international politics is perhaps contributing to a great loss of life than would otherwise have occurred.

LBC frequently used the humanitarian angle to cover the story as well, but it dedicated more time to covering the repercussions of the conflict on international politics. Specifically it talks about how Turkey and Iran were responding to the developing events. It also described the internal working of the UN's Security Council describing the conflict between Russia, China, and the United States. LBC presented the Syrian crisis as a problem that was polarizing global politics in addition to threatening Lebanon's stability.

Al-Manar framed the Syrian crisis as being the result of an illegitimate insurrection by anti-democratic rebels. The Syrian government was presented as defending the well-being of its citizens while the rebels were depicted as foreign proxies meant to destabilize an anti-Western regime. In its broadcast from December 16, 2012, the telecaster, Ghada al-Nimr, sums up Hassan Nasrallah's take on the situation by saying:

مع الأسف معاركة طويلة في سوريا لأن المعارضة المسلحة وما يقف خلفها من دول الإقليمية ترفضوا استمرار الحوار وحمل لهم مسؤولية كل من يقتل في سوريا وخلال حفلة التخرج السنوي لطلاب جمعيتين قال سيد ناصر الله أننا نعتقد أن المعارضة المسلحة قادرة على حاسم المسأل عسكريا مشتبها جدا مشيرا إلى أن الامريكيين والاوروبيين وبعض الحكومات العربية نصب كمينا للقائدة في سوريا ليقتلوا بعضهم بعض.

Unfortunately, there is a long battle in Syria because the armed opposition and those regional and international states that stand behind it, reject continuing negotiations, and he [Nasrallah] assigned responsibility to them for the people being killed in Syria. During an annual graduation ceremony, Nasrallah said to the students that he considers it extremely doubtful that the armed opposition is capable of settling the matter militarily. He indicated that Americans, Europeans, and some Arab governments have set a trap for Al-Qaeda in Syria so that they would fight amongst themselves.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ (MurrTelevision 2012)


⁵⁸ (al-Manar 2012)

The story is almost the complete inverse of LBC and MTV's framing. While LBC portrayed the conflict as polarizing global politics, al-Manar portrayed global schisms as tearing Syria apart.

Integration of the Narratives

al-Manar

Figure 1: al-Manar's news coverage by region



Al-Manar's nightly news broadcast on December 16, 2012 gave the most comprehensive portrayal of the Syrian crisis and its relationship to Lebanese politics. Though its coverage's distribution and format was atypical, it reveals some of the assumptions that underlie the usual broadcasts. The program mainly covered a speech that Hassan Nasrallah gave at a graduation. The news bulletin would play clips from the speech where Nasrallah was talking about a certain issue, and use that to introduce a story about the issue. Important topics received analysis from a guest expert.

This news bulletin began with Nasrallah's view on Syria, and slowly transitioned to his views on local politics. Nasrallah presented events in Syria as being the result of a Western scheme to pit Al-Qaeda against an anti-West regime. He alleged that the majority of opposition

fighters were from outside Syria, and that local fighters were being funded by the US. He asserted that the insurgency was illegitimate because it was fighting against a democratic and representative regime. He further claimed that it was an attempt by the West to cause Muslims to fight other Muslims, and that the only parties benefitting from the conflict were the US and Europe.

The news bulletin smoothly transitions from what Nasrallah said about Syria to his opinion on Palestine. Similar to his portrayal of Syria, he asserts that the events in Palestine are the results of foreign intervention. It is another instance of Muslims suffering due to the actions of Westerners. He emphasizes the material hardships faced by Palestinians and the lack of democratic processes.


The news bulletin then transitions to the plight of the Shi'ah in Southern Lebanon. The subtle implication is that they, like the Palestinians, are suffering materially due to undemocratic processes and foreign intervention. This broadcast is one of the few times that the internal political dynamics of Lebanon are explicitly recognized. The link to political representation is then clarified when Nasrallah criticizes his Lebanese political opponents for postponing a new round of elections. He claims that they are trying to cause the collapse of a legitimate governing force. At this point, the subtle link between Syrian and Lebanese politics is completed. The rebels in Syria are causing chaos and civilian suffering by attempting to topple a legitimate regime, and Nasrallah's opponents are doing much the same. He then calls for his followers to take political action.

The progression of the news bulletin acts as a fluid argument that excites anger and outrage over the events in Syria and Palestine, and then, connects that outrage to concrete actions that can be taken in the local context. This strategy of overlaying narratives integrates the

region's events into one cohesive story of foreign intervention preventing the implementation of the people's will.

After finishing coverage of Nasrallah's speech, the bulletin continues with the themes of democratic representation and legitimacy. It first presents the constitutional referendum underway in Egypt as an instance where a corrupt regime was overthrown by an indigenous opposition. It emphasizes the plurality of voices that are being aired through elections. In contrast, it reintroduces the crisis in Syria, by quoting a Syrian politician who claims that the opposition is too divided to represent the Syrian people or take government. The Syrian opposition is presented as foreign, inauthentic and unrepresentative while the Egyptian opposition is presented as genuine and democratic. This point is underscored when the news program credits the opposition with attacking a Palestinian refugee camp. This cycle of stories reinforces the identification of the Syrian opposition with the illegitimate use of force by Israeli forces. The narratives constructed about Lebanese domestic politics and regional dynamics are conflated to a point of almost being indistinguishable.

Figure 2: LBC's news coverage by region




LBC employs a similar strategy to that of al-Manar in its December 16th Broadcast, but attempts to assert an inverse narrative. Like al-Manar, the program begins by covering Nasrallah's speech, but he is only given a minute of airtime. The rest of the news broadcast is spent refuting his claim that Syria is Western trap for al-Qaeda. After a two-minute segment on the Egyptian constitution, the program begins its entry into the Syrian conflict by discussing two stories of Lebanese citizens who were trapped in Syria. One story focuses on the returning of dead bodies while the second story focuses on the successful release of Lebanese hostages. The broadcast then transitions to the attack on the Palestinian refugee camp. Unlike al-Manar, it clearly places the blame on the regime's air forces. The broadcast then does a humanitarian story about how displaced Syrians and Palestinians will face tough winter conditions.

The implication of these stories is that the events in Syria are strongly linked to events in Lebanon. Not only are Lebanese citizens directly affected by the situation, but Syrians are

crossing the border in search of safety. The LBC broadcast creates a clear dichotomy between domestic Lebanese actors and foreign Syrian actors. The overall narrative is about the danger that the Syrian conflict plays to Lebanese people and society.

The narrative continues by covering the Egyptian election a second time. Similar to the al-Manar program, this juxtaposition makes a clear contrast, of a successful Arab Spring with what some of deemed the Syrian Winter. The LBC sets up this dynamic by talking about the winter conditions that displaced Syrian will face. It further reinforces this by showing how the Egyptians are now able to express themselves through using the vote. The need to protect Lebanese politics from the threat of Syria is reinforced by the subsequent story that covers the Maronite Patriarch saying that it is a shame that Lebanese elections should not be delayed due to instability in Syria. This is a powerful contrast between the Egyptian going to the election booth, displaced Syrians fleeing to Lebanon, and Lebanese citizens being prevented from voting. The Lebanese identity is further reinforced by the next story, which covers Sami Jumayyil complaining about the exclusion of a Lebanese resistance movement from history books. These stories when taken together imply that in order to protect its democratic system Lebanon needs oppose the threat of Syria.

Figure 3: MTV's news coverage by region



The broadcast that most exemplifies MTV narrative about Syria was broadcast on December 17, 2012. The MTV narrative is far more parochial. It begins with a story on politicians in Jabria who are afraid of leaving their houses because of sectarian violence. The broadcast then transitions to sectarian violence in Syria. Next the program covers the refugee influx to Lebanon. It concludes with the Maronite Patriarch accepting a delegation from Syria.

This sequence of stories reveals the significance that the Syrian crisis has within Lebanese politics. Similar to MTV there is a palpable fear that instability abroad will lead to instability at home. MTV specifically implies that events in Syria may lead to an increase in sectarian violence in Lebanon. To some extent it effaces the distinction between Syrian and Lebanese identities by concluding with a story of cooperation between Lebanese and Syrian officials. The story, however, still takes a very sectarian take on relations within the two countries even though the Syrian delegation was composed of people from mixed religious backgrounds.

Conclusion

From analyzing the content and strategies used in presenting the nightly broadcasts, it can be seen that these three television stations present starkly different views of the relationship between the Syrian crisis and Lebanese politics. MTV focuses on the Lebanese side of the story and the implications that the conflict has on Lebanon. In contrast, al-Manar practically ignores Lebanon as a political entity focusing more regional attitudes and responses. LBC takes a more mixed approach, balancing between domestic Lebanese issues, Syrian problems, and the international community. Interestingly, all three channels emphasize the importance of democratic processes and creating legitimacy.

Chapter 3: Syria in Lebanese Print Media

This chapter discusses the framing of the Syrian conflict in two of Lebanon's leading print journals. It consists of a general overview of how Syria was covered, and then proceeds to content analysis in order to reveal the specific linguistic characteristics used in portrayals of the conflict's main actors. This chapter aims to compare how actors are described by two different journals and also how these descriptions change over time. First, the methods used to analyze the articles are described. Then, a description of the frames initially used by the two periodicals in their coverage of Syria is presented. Next, portrayals of the Syrian conflict's main actors are described to show how they reinforce the story's framing. Lastly, a description of how these portrayals changed over time is presented. The main conclusion is that though the two periodicals began in January with contrasting writing styles, by the beginning of February, the language used in their articles on Syria became remarkably similar.

Framing

Al-Mustaqbal and *as-Safir* used very different frames when covering the Syrian crisis. *Al-Mustaqbal* tended to present the conflict as being a chaotic human rights crisis. There was a strong emphasis placed on the negative effects that the crisis was having on Lebanese politics. In contrast, *as-Safir* tended to frame the situation as a conflict between the Assad regime and rebel forces. A large number of its articles focused on the question of whether or not there could be a political solution to the crisis.

The vast majority of *al-Mustaqbal*'s stories on Syria focused on the plight of Syrian refugees that have fled to Lebanon. The stories describe the troubling conditions in Syria that led to their exodus, and then continue to describe the refugees' continuing hardship in Lebanon due to the Lebanese government's lack of sufficient resources to take care of them. Next, stories

frequently focus on the challenge that events in Syria posed towards Lebanese politics. Political stagnation in Lebanon was blamed on polarization that was seen as resulting from the Syrian crisis. The articles that did focus on the internal dynamics of the conflict in Syria usually came from the Associated Press, and portrayed it as an asymmetrical fight between Assad's regime and rebel forces. One story, which was accompanied by a particularly graphic picture of charred corpses, opened with a line describing the violence Syria by saying:

بالمجازر والاشلاء والجثث المترامية على مساحة سوريا حاصدة اكثر من 60 الف روح تأكيد الامم المتحدة أمس، ودع الأسد العام 2012، ليستقبل العام 2013 بمحرقة أودت أكثر من 120 شهيدا في قصف بالطيران الحربي أمس على محطة للوقود قرب دمشق.

The UN confirmed yesterday that more than 60 thousand human lives were lost in massacres and carnage; their bodies are littered across the Syrian landscape. Al-Assad said goodbye to 2012 and welcomed 2013 with mass carnage that claimed the lives of more than 120 victims in air bombing that hit a gas station near Damascus.⁵⁹

As the opening to the article, this paragraph cues the reader to perceive Assad as ruthlessly killing his own people. Notably, a sectarian frame was hardly ever emphasized in the articles.

As-Safir portrayed the conflict in starkly different terms. Its articles deemphasize the conflict's death toll and the refugee crisis, and they emphasize the potential for a political solution. Similarly, when refugees are mentioned the problem is framed as how to best facilitate their return. Unlike *al-Mustaqbal*, there is no direct link made between the Syrian crisis and problems within Lebanon. More so than in *al-Mustaqbal*'s articles, the Syrian conflict and its resolution is linked to foreign intervention. An article from January 1st states:

تدخل سوريا لعام 2013 وهي بين احتمالي تدهور الأوضاع الأمنية والمعيشية وبين احتمالات تسوية سياسية، تعمل من أجلها موسكو وواشنطن والمبعوث الدولي والعربي إلى سوريا الأخضر الإبراهيمي الذي كان حذر من أن غياب الحل السياسي سيؤدي إلى "انهيار الدولة السورية..."

Syria entered 2013 with the twin possibilities of either further degradation in its living and security situation and or a political resolution. Moscow, Washington, and the UN's special envoy to Syria, al-Akhdar al-Ibrahimi, are working towards just such an

⁵⁹ (2013 دمشق في أسدية محرقة)

agreement. Ibrahimi warned that the absence of a political solution will lead to the collapse of the Syrian state.⁶⁰

This description of the conflict emphasizes the role that foreigners are playing to resolve the conflict, and allows for the newspaper to avoid focusing on the conflict's death toll. International actors are often presented as preventing a Syrian solution to the conflict. Competition between Israel and Iran is presented as exacerbating the situation, while the power politics of Russia and the United States are seen as offering unrealistic solutions to the conflict and simultaneously providing the Assad regime and the opposition forces with the means to continue fighting.

Portrayals of Key Actors

The Regime

In general, *al-Mustaqbal* presents the Syrian regime as an aggressive actor. The regime is most often presented as bombing civilians during air raids and failing to provide citizens with basic necessities. The regime is also portrayed as exporting terrorism and instability to Lebanon.

The opening sentence to one article from January 4 states:

يبدو أن النظام السوري الذي يدمر سوريا فوق رؤوس أهلها والذي لم يوفر شخصية مثل ميشال سماعة لاستخدامها في مخططاته الارهابية تحاه لبنان، لم يوفر الآن مأساة النازحين الهاربين من بطشة وإجرامه لاستخدامها وسيلة لتمرير مخططات ارهابية واجرامية جديدة في لبنان.

It seems that the Syrian regime which is causing Syria to collapse on the heads of its people, and which offered up a character like Michel Samaha in order to use him in its terrorist plans towards Lebanon, and is now creating the crisis of these refugees fleeing its violent offenses, in order to expand its new terrorist and criminal plans in Lebanon.⁶¹

This sentence delegitimizes the Syrian regime from the outset. It also gives current accusations that Syria is sending terrorists to Lebanon disguised as refugees added salience by referencing

⁶⁰ (2013) الأسد خروج على ينطوي أن بد لا حل أي: باريس)

⁶¹ (2013) الإسرائيلية الغارة على بالرد الأسد تكالب طهران)

Michel Samaha who was a Lebanese government official that was convicted of committing acts of terror on Syria's behalf.

Most articles offer less direct criticisms of the Assad regime. The typical method was to mention civilian deaths in close association with bombing attacks by regime airplanes.

Interestingly, "Assad" is used as an adjective to describe regime forces or figures in some articles. Most of these articles also use "regime" and "Syrian" to describe these same figures, but a general trend is that "Assad" is used as an adjective when particularly offensive or violent acts are being committed. One example is in a story about the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon, he is referred to as "Assad's Ambassador" when he is making claims that seem implausible. This moniker is used when he claims that Syria is becoming safe enough for refugees to begin returning to their homes. Though no language in the article directly contradicts this claim, the article is positioned on the news page so that it is surrounded on three sides by an article where the second sentence accuses Assad of committing massacres.

In addition to being used as a term that delegitimizes the person or group to which it is assigned, the name Assad is also strongly linked to inhumane acts of violence. The article mentioned in the above section on framing that discusses charred corpses is entitled "Mahraqa Assadiyah fi Damashq" (Assad's Burnt Sacrifice/Incinerator in Damascus)⁶². When fighting forces are mentioned, they are usually described as "regime forces" when they are engaging in combat with opposition groups. In contrast, they are referred to as "Assad's forces" when they are committing violent acts against citizens. The *Shabiha*, the Ba'ath Party's plain-clothes intimidation force, is always described as belonging to Assad. Notably, the regime is never described as being Alawite.

⁶² (2013 دمشق في أسدية محرقة)

Articles in *al-Mustaqbal* most frequently describe the regime as being an illegitimate aggressor in the Syrian conflict. It is portrayed as committing massacres, driving refugees out of the country, and ignoring the suffering of the Syrians who remain inside the country. An interesting aspect of word choice is that particularly horrific acts were linked directly to Assad while less illegitimate uses of force were linked to the Syrian regime.

As-Safir paints a more positive picture of President Assad and his regime. In general, Assad is portrayed as desiring a political solution to the crisis and as having to deal with an opposition that refuses to negotiate. The paper quotes Assad in an article from January 9 as saying:

انه لا بد وقبل اية تسوية، من وقف أعمال العنف وإراحة السوريين انسانيًا واجتماعيًا وخاصة لجهة إعطاء أولوية لعودة النازحين وإغاثتهم وتلبية حاجتهم "ونحن من جهتنا مستعدون للالتزام بوقف النار، لكن السؤاات من هي الجهة الدولية التي ستضمن وقف أعمال العنف من قبل الجانب الآخر.

It is necessary to accept any agreement that stops the acts of violence, and provides for the humanitarian and societal comfort of Syrians, especially giving priority to the return of the displaced with regards to relieving their suffering and satisfying their needs. "We, on our part, are ready to impose a cease-fire, but the question is who from the international community will ensure that the other side maintains the cease-fire."⁶³

Allowing Assad to speak on his own behalf enables him to present himself as being primarily concerned with the safety of his people as opposed to the safety of his regime. Positive portrayals of the regime are tempered by figures taken from the Syrian Human Rights Watch describing civilian deaths caused by his regime's air raids. *As-Safir* also complicates its portrayal of the Syrian regime by including quotations from a variety of critical international figures. One article quotes Egypt's President describing the situation in Syria as a "blood bath." The same article quotes the French foreign minister as well as the US' State Department condemning President Assad for the acts he has committed against his citizens.

⁶³ (2013) وواشنطن موسكو بين أفكار مع تتقاطع مبادرته أن يرى الأسد)

Despite the inclusion of opposing portrayals of the Syrian regime, *as-Safir's* portrayal of the regime tends to be positive. Its articles' first paragraphs usually quote regime officials' descriptions of events. Negative descriptions of the regime tend to come at the very end of articles or in the articles continuation several pages inside the periodical.

The Opposition

Representations of the Syrian opposition forces in *al-Mustaqbal* tend to be complex and inconsistent. Articles mention various components of the opposition without explaining what differentiates them. Articles switch between describing actions by the Free Syrian Army and the Al-Nusra Front. They also use a variety of words to describe the opposition's armed forces. The most common phrase is "opposition fighters," but other terms include "revolutionaries" and "opposition armed forces."

The opposition is generally portrayed as the conflict's protagonists. Though *al-Mustaqbal* does not support them directly, its articles imply that their cause is more legitimate than the Syrian regime's. One way this is accomplished is through describing the civilian casualties caused by the regime's air raids, and describing rebel attempts to gain control of air fields immediately afterwards. One such instance is an article that appeared January 3. In one paragraph, it describes Assad's forces as engaging in vicious attacks on Damascus' suburbs with the aim of demoralizing the Opposition. The very next sentence describes the opposition fighters saying:

وفي محافظة ادلب (شمال غرب)، دارت اشتباكات عنيفة بين القوات النظامية ومقاتلين من جبهة النصرة وكتائب احرار الشام والطلیعة الاسلامیة الذین اقتحموا مطار تفتناز العسکری واستولوا علیه حسب فضائیة العربیة نقلت عن اتحاد التنسقیات الثورة السوریة.

In Idlib (Northwest), there were violent clashes between regime forces and fighters from the Nusrah Front, Sham Liberation Brigades, and the Islamic front which sieged Tiftnaz

Military Airport and took control of according to a report from the satellite station al-Arabiya released by the union for coordination of the Syrian Revolution.⁶⁴

The implication is that the opposition is fighting to end the regime's indiscriminate attacks on its people. The article also gives the impression that despite the diversity of groups involved in fight the regime, they do so with a high degree of coordination.

The infractions that some opposition groups have committed against civilians are rarely mentioned, and opposition groups' negative attributes are not described in detail. Interestingly, when the al-Nusra Front is mentioned, articles rarely discuss allegations that it is associated with al-Qaeda. The only time opposition groups are linked to civilian suffering is when civilian casualties are discussed in the context of clashes between regime and opposition forces. In contrast when describing the same opposition attack on the airport in an article from January 4, *as-Safir* describes the opposition saying:

واستطاعت القوات السورية صد هجوم ضخّم شنه مئات المسلّحين الاسلاميين على مطار تفتاز العسكري في ريف ادلب...

The Syrian forces were able to repel a huge attack by armed Islamist on the Tinfaz Military Airport in the suburbs of Idlib...⁶⁵

This is one of the few times that either periodical used the word "Islamists." It is also interesting that the illegitimacy and foreignness of the Islamists is reinforced by referring to Assad's forces as "the Syrian forces."

Articles in *as-Safir* also portray the opposition as being disorganized, but often these portrayals present the opposition as being responsible for causing the crisis. In many of the articles, they are presented as acting outside of Syria's established institutions and preventing the

⁶⁴ (2013 دمشق في أسدية محرقة)

⁶⁵ (2013 الأزمة لحل الدولي للتوافق أولية خطوات عن تتحدث دمشق)

regime from negotiating with legitimate representatives of the Syrian people. One article published on January 1 quotes the Russian Foreign Minister as saying:

...نجاح المعارضة المسلحة لن لن ينهي المشكلة, بل ربما ينقلها إلى طابع آخر. فيتحول "النظام" أو قوى النظام إلى المعارضة المسلحة. كما يحذر من خطر التقسيم.

...The success of the armed opposition will not end the problem. Rather it could move it to a different level. It could convert the “regime” or the regime’s forces into the armed opposition. It also poses the threat of division.⁶⁶

This quote is meant to support the idea that the only possible solution to crisis is a political agreement between the regime and the opposition. It suggests that the opposition will be incapable of uniting the country if it defeats the regime, but maintains a more agnostic stance than *al-Mustaqbal* as to which party possesses greater legitimacy.

Coverage of the opposition in *as-Safir* gives them a less central role than *al-Mustaqbal*’s coverage does. Though the two news sources generally use similar terms, the terms that do not overlap are indicative of the periodicals’ differing orientations. This is most noticeable with *al-Mustaqbal*’s occasional use of the word “thuwar” or “revolutionaries” whereas *as-Safir* would occasionally use the term “Munshaquun” “dissidents” or “separatists.” Though a minor difference, *al-Mustaqbal*’s use of the term revolutionaries lends legitimacy to the fighters while the root of the term used by *as-Safir* denotes breaking apart, segregating, or being troublesome. In *as-Safir*, the Syrian regime and international actors play more central roles than does the opposition.

Refugees

Al-Mustaqbal focuses a great deal on the plight of refugees. Most stories focus either on the conditions that are causing refugees to flee their homes or focus on the continued challenges that they face once they take up residence in refugee camps. When the refugees are not referred

⁶⁶ (2013) والتسوية التدهور احتمالي بين 2013 في سوريا)

to as victims of a humanitarian crisis, they are presented as bringing violence and instability to Lebanon. Numerous articles focused on conflicts breaking out within refugee camps between groups representing different Syrian factions. One article claims that members of Bashar al-Assad's *Shabiha*, a security force known for its cruelty, was purposely infiltrating refugee camps in order to promote instability. Another common point of discussion is the idea that arguments over the Lebanese government's policy towards Lebanese refugees were causing the Lebanese political system to stall.

Refugees play a relatively unimportant role in *as-Safir's* articles. The Syrian crisis is presented as being primarily an internal problem. When refugees are mentioned it was within the context of restoring stability within Syria so that they could return to their homes. An article on a speech by Nasrallah is the only time that the refugees play a central role in an article's subject matter. It is also the only time that an explicit link was made between the Syrian crisis and internal Lebanese political conflicts.

Corresponding to *as-Safir's* stronger focus on the crisis as internal problem, articles in the journal tend to mention the Syrian people significantly more than *al-Mustaqbal*. Specifically the word "sha'b" is used more frequently, which is a word that invokes more of sense of nationhood than does the term Syrians. In *as-Safir*, President al-Assad is portrayed as protecting the rights of the Syrian people which seems to address the rallying cry of other revolts in Arab countries, which have used a slogan which placed the regime in contradistinction to the people. *As-Safir* more so than *al-Mustaqbal* sets the Syrian people as a group with different interests from the Syrian opposition groups. In *al-Mustaqbal* Syrians are either refugees, members of the opposition, or regime loyalists. In contrast, *as-Safir* portrays the majority of Syrians as being non-combatants whose interests are not being accurately represented by the Syrian opposition.

An interesting note about word choice is that both papers used the word “Nazih” to refer to Syrians who have fled their homes as opposed to the term “laaja,” which is more commonly used to refer to refugees. “Nazih” has become associated with the English term “displaced person,” but its root meaning is more closely related to “emigrant” or a person who has travelled away from their home. Both papers do use “laaja” in a couple of instances, but it is not clear why the switch occurs. It is worth noting that both articles that use the term “laaja” are translations from the Associated Press.

The International Community

The international community is portrayed quite differently in the two papers. *Al-Mustaqbal* mainly described international efforts to help refugees that were fleeing to Syria’s neighboring countries. Also, quotations from United Nations’ officials and other diplomats are used as a way to voice criticism for the actions of the Syrian government. The most frequently cited actors are Human Rights Watch, the UN, France, the US, and Iran. Iran, China, and Russia are presented as supporting the regime and enabling it to continue despite ostracism from other international actors. The UN’s Security Council is frequently mentioned as being unable to respond to the crisis in an effective manner. Most Arab countries are presented as being supportive of the opposition. The President of Egypt, Mohammad Morsi, is the Arab figure with quotations that most strongly criticize the regime.

In general, *al-Mustaqbal* does not report on the opinions that Lebanese politicians have on the events inside Syria. The journal mainly deals with their views on how to handle the flood of refugees that is straining Lebanon’s resources. Other criticisms include the idea that the events in Syria are causing the government to stall in writing a new election law.

One news story that departs from typical non-sectarian coverage of Lebanese politicians' views on the Syrian crisis is a section of a news article about statements that Hasan Nasrallah made about Lebanese citizens that had been abducted in Syria. Nasrallah made a statement implying that Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries could play a more proactive role in encouraging the Syrians responsible for abductions to release their captives. In response to this statement, Okab Sakr, a Shi'i politician that belongs to the 14 March Movement, said that al-Assad was trying to cause sectarian conflict in Lebanon by using Lebanese proxies. He then used an Arabic expression, "raising the shirt of Othman," which invokes a dispute that helped generate the original split between Sunnis and Shiites. This particular saying implies that the person it is directed against is rallying people to a cause by inciting anger over an injustice for which the speaker feels no sincere outrage. Sakr's response seems like a veiled attack on Nasrallah that questions the authenticity of his concern for the kidnapped Lebanese. It is also a coded challenge to Nasrallah's status as a loyal Shi'i.

As-Safir shows a much stronger concern for the international aspect to the Syrian crisis. Many of the articles focus on how the posturing of regional powers determines the course of events in Syria. The primary international actors are Iran, Israel, the US, and Russia. Israel is presented as meddling in Syrian affairs in order to protect its geo-strategic interests. The United States is presented as an ally to Israel that bases its foreign policy on oil interests and Israel's security. Iran is presented as providing the regime with large amounts of financial and military aid, while Russia is presented as offering Syria political and financial support that is contingent on it not hindering its more important geostrategic positions.

The most surprising aspect of analyzing how these articles cover international actors is that, excluding the aforementioned exception, most of the articles avoid using a sectarian lens in

analyzing the situation in Syria. Though some of the articles in *as-Safir* mention Israeli hopes for a faltering “Access of Evil,” most articles avoid describing Syria and Iran’s alliance as being motivated by religion. The only other notable exception to the non-sectarian nature of the coverage is an article in *al-Mustaqbal*, which indicates that some politicians were concerned that refugees were receiving different treatment depending on their religious and political backgrounds.

Changes in the Coverage over Time

After an Islamic summit that was held in Cairo on February 4, 2013, there was a noticeable shift in how both journals cover the Syrian crisis. The most surprising aspect of this shift is that the two periodicals seemed to converge in how they covered Syria. Notably, it is not the case that one journal maintained its original coverage while the other began conforming to a new narrative. Both papers made slight alterations to their coverage that resulted in their articles becoming more similar.

Specifically, *al-Mustaqbal* reduced the frequency with which stories on its front page emphasized the humanitarian crisis or the large number of refugees. It began emphasizing the potential for a political agreement that would lead to the regime’s abdication of power. For its part, *as-Safir* stopped its positive coverage of the Assad regime. It also began to treat the opposition as though it were the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. It increasingly used the word “revolution” to refer to fighting in Syria and the word “revolutionaries” to describe opposition fighters. Another interesting point of convergence between the periodicals’ coverage is that *al-Mustaqbal* began to increasingly use the phrase “al-sha’b al-suri” (the Syrian people). In this way, both periodicals began to speak of the rights of the Syrian people using the same language and strongly implied that the Assad regime was no longer the proper

representative of the Syrian people. This increase in *al-Mustaqbal*'s references to the Syrian people also coincided with a reduction in the number of times the paper referenced Syrian refugees.

The main aspects of the newspapers coverage that remained the same were that *al-Mustaqbal* continued to portray Iran as supporting an illegitimate regime and *as-Safir* continued to show a stronger emphasis on the role of the international community in determining the course of events in Syria. All of the front-page stories about Syria that appeared in *as-Safir* focused on the positions that foreign powers were taking with regards to how the crisis could be settled. *As-Safir* continued to emphasize the importance of a resolution to the crisis determined by the Syrian people, but it and *al-Mustaqbal* began to use the phrase "a peaceful departure" when referring to the Assad regime's ultimate fate. Though coverage in the papers continued to maintain some slight differences, the degree to which their coverage began to converge after the Islamic summit was considerable.

Conclusion

Al-Mustaqbal and *as-Safir* began January with markedly different coverage of the Syrian crisis, but by the beginning of February their stories used remarkably similar language to describe the crisis, its actors, and potential solutions. The nature of this change is reminiscent to a similar phenomenon that John Noakes and Karin Wilkins identified with regard to American media coverage of the first Palestinian Intifadah. In their article they noted that as the Palestinian resistance changed its tactics to ones that were accepted by Western media sources, they received greater and more sympathetic coverage.⁶⁷ Similarly, the Syrian Opposition announced that it was willing to enter into negotiations with the Syrian regime during the Islamic

⁶⁷ (Noakes and Wilkins 2002)

Summit. This was a complete reversal of its previous stances that rejected negotiation. As international efforts began to focus on achieving a political solution to the crisis and recognizing the opposition's legitimacy so too did media coverage of the crisis and the opposition. The changed tactics of the opposition resulted in their movement receiving more favorable coverage, but it also resulted in Iran and the Syrian regime receiving less favorable coverage from *as-Safir*.

This study suggests that the way a periodical covers various international actors is not predetermined by its political orientation, and that they are sensitive to changes in the political stances of actors. Interestingly in an article published by *as-Safir* in March, the opposition was no longer portrayed as being legitimate. Also, the sectarian tone of the article was much sharper than in the time periods that this article took under consideration. The article asserted that a large number of the fighters in Syria were Tunisian youth funded by Saudi Arabia and trained in Libya as part of Sunni conspiracy to remove a Shiite regime. Looking at coverage of the Syrian crisis in these two papers reveals that narratives in the media are dynamic and at times, internally inconsistent.

Chapter 4: Political Conflict in Lebanese Media in 1978

This chapter adds global and historical contexts to understanding how Lebanese media cover the civil unrest in Syria that starting in 2011. In assessing the significance of the Arab Spring, journalists have already called it a turning point in world history and, more specifically, the history of social movements⁶⁸. In order to better understand contemporary coverage of the Syrian conflict, I compare how a Lebanese periodical covered the Iranian revolution to its coverage in Israeli and Iraqi periodicals. I include comparisons of other events happening during the same time frame. This comparison reveals how the geopolitical position of a country as well as its internal politics can affect the language its media uses to cover world events. The chapter provides a temporal point of contrast that elucidates the effects of Lebanon's intimate political relationship with Syria on media coverage.

This chapter studies coverage of a pivot point in Iran's civil unrest, which foreshadowed the coming revolution. The pivot point is a 1978 government crackdown on student protests that became known as Black Friday.⁶⁹ The event's ominous moniker, which appeared in the news less than two weeks after it occurred, is indicative of the significance it held at that time and the significance it continues to hold today. Similarly to the current crisis in Syria, international observers were unsure of the exact nature of the protests that were taking shape in Iran 1978. They had no idea about what type of regime would replace the Shah's repressive reign.

I first examine the portrayals of the events surrounding Black Friday in two of the three regional newspapers examined in order to provide a context for understanding how the events were nominally perceived at the time. This section takes into consideration the news spanning from September 5th, 1978 through September 13th, 1978. Next, the chapter analyzes how four

⁶⁸ (Wright 2012)

⁶⁹ (Martial Law Foiled Communist Plot 1978)

other historically significant and contemporaneous events were covered by the same newspapers in order to reveal the impact of geopolitics on the narrative frames that are used to interpret news events. The four events analyzed are the Camp David negotiations, the revolt in Rhodesia, the Revolution in Nicaragua, and violence in Lebanon. Finally, I place all of the portrayals in dialog not only with each other, but also with current understandings of the event's significance. This contextualization reveals how the Lebanese periodical's coverage compared to coverage of civil unrest in the print media of other countries in the region, and also shows the significant role that Syria plays in Lebanese media's discourse.

The chapter concludes that the portrayal of international events in media designed for domestic consumption is a delicate balance between a media institution's stated or unstated interests and the articulated or unarticulated ontological frameworks that its journalist use in understanding the world. More pointedly stated, a media outlet, due to its geopolitical position, has a limited number of narrative frames at its disposal, and these frames will limit how it covers a story. The greater the challenge an event poses to the institution's interests or ontological framework, the more restrictive its frames become. Extreme challenges may result in frames so restrictive that they generate hyperbolic and cartoonish portrayals or, ironically, the reverse may occur: perplexingly sterile descriptions of harrowing events. This chapter found that events as politically, religiously, and socially charged as those of September 1978 inspired both types of extreme responses. It suggests that similar processes may be underway in the Lebanese media's coverage of the current Syrian crisis.

The Black Friday Narrative in the Baghdad Observer

In the days preceding the arrival of the Japanese Prime Minister to Iran on September 5th, 1978, 15 people died in the 5-day long protests that occurred in Tehran, Qom, and Khorram, and Abadan. The demonstrators were reported to have smashed windows.⁷⁰ The Iranian national radio station claims that the casualties in Tehran were two policemen and two protestors. If the entire month of Ramadan is taken into consideration, then 37 people died in violent clashes.

On September 7, the government issued a ban on public gatherings because “urban guerillas” had attacked a security base armed with machine guns, killing one guard. The assailants also spread leaflets promising to kill all policemen.⁷² The ban came just one day before a planned demonstration to commemorate the deaths of people in previous weeks’ demonstrations where over 100,000 people participated. Opposition leaders and shop-keepers in Tehran Bazaar call for strikes.⁷³

On September 8, over 100,000 peaceful demonstrators gathered in Tehran calling for political freedom. The bazaris organize general strikes in honor of 37 protestors who died in previous weeks. Other cities and towns organize smaller rallies. Despite protests, the Shah is expected to go on with his trip to Eastern Europe.⁷⁴

Apparently, more than 58 people died and 208 were injured in clashes in Tehran on September 8th. Automatic weapons were fired on protestors, some of whom were women, for refusing to disperse. Martial law has been imposed in 11 cities. As a result of the disturbances, the Japanese Prime Minister’s dinner was interrupted.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ (Four Killed in Iran Clashes 1978)

⁷¹ (Fukuda Visits Iran 1978)

⁷² (Demonstrators Attack Police Station in Teheran 1978)

⁷³ (Iran bans Public Processions 1978)

⁷⁴ (Demonstrators defy Iran's ban order 1978)

⁷⁵ (More die in Clashes as martial law Clamps on Teheran 1978)

On Sunday, September 10, Opposition leaders walked out of parliamentary meeting in protest of Jafar Sherif Emami's, the newly installed prime minister, program. Led by Mohsen Pezeshgour, opposition leaders shouted anti-government slogans as they exited the building. Sporadic flare ups of violence seemed likely as bazaris continue to shut their stores.⁷⁶⁷⁷ The Iranian government targets opposition leaders in a series of jailings. Bazaris continue to close shops for a fourth day.⁷⁸

Tehran seemed to be enjoying a tense calm. The government arrests several more ministers including former health minister. Bazaris continue with shop closures. The government claims that only 97 were killed and 205 wounded during demonstrations, but the opposition claims that nearly 3,000 died in clashes. Political and religious figures call for day of mourning.

The Black Friday Narrative in An-Nahar

On September 4, over a thousand people protested for the return of Ayatollah Khomeini, offering flowers to soldiers. Religious officials banned participants from committing acts of violence. Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari rejects negotiations with the government until free elections are held. Karim Sanjabi, a liberal opposition leader, said he might not be opposed to working with communists if they agreed to cut their ties with foreign countries.⁷⁹⁸⁰⁸¹

Protest movements are the product of over 8 months of work by religious opposition leaders to show that foreign communities do not control Iranian streets. Prime Minister Jafar

⁷⁶ (Row in Iran's Parliament 1978)

⁷⁷ (Bloody Clashes Continue 1978)

⁷⁸ (Detentions in Iran over Discontent 1978)

⁷⁹ (1978 ما يورك؟ دو بالما إلى ديا لاجانت فرح العراق من الخميني بعودة وطالبوا تظاهروا الالاف منات :طهران)

⁸⁰ (1978 فوكودو استقبل الشاه)

⁸¹ (1978 دعمه مءكدا بالشاه يتصل كارتر والمعارضة السلطة بين حوار في أمل لا)

Sharif Emami calls for Muslims to return to the correct path, and says that he is constant contact with religious leaders.⁸²

On September 8th, over 100,000 peaceful protesters gathered in Tehran in memory of protestors who died during the protests on Eid. Some demonstrators wanted Ayatollah Khomeini to be allowed to return from exile. Foreign diplomats and moderate Iranian observers claim that the Shah's regime is not in real danger. Khomeini claims that the gatherings are evidence that the people want the Shah to leave.⁸³

Over 250 people died in clashes between military and opposition supporter in what is beginning to look like a real revolution.⁸⁴⁸⁵ Religious leaders defied the Shah's ban in order to call for the return of Khomeini. The government began to arrest lawyers and politicians believed to be associated with the protests. The Soviets claimed that the United States is supporting the Shah in order to protect their access to Iranian oil.⁸⁶

Security forces searched the home of Karim Sanjabi and the home of the president of the Commission for Protecting Human Rights. Both men feared arrest. Abba Huweida resigned post as head of Imperial Court for undisclosed reasons.

On September 10, martial law was declared in 11 cities, and rumors circulate that it was Israelis who were responsible for firing the first shots which ended the peaceful protests on Friday September 8th.

On September 11th, the regime began arresting former political representatives in an attempt to quell public resentment. A large number of businessmen were also banned from leaving the country. Shaykh Yahya Al-Noori becomes the most prominent religious figure to be

⁸² (1978 ايران في حذر هدوء)

⁸³ (1978 معسكر على هجوم في شرطي مقتل للمناقش برنجه تقديم توجل والحكومة اليوم للمعارضة عام اضواب :ايران)

⁸⁴ (1978 المعارض ومويدي الجيش بين ايران اشتباكات في قتيلا 250)

⁸⁵ (1978 المعارض ومويدي الجيش بين ايران اشتباكات في قتيلا 250)

⁸⁶ (1978 مايورك؟ دو بالما إلى ديلاجانت فرح العراق من الخميني بعودة وطالبوا تظاهروا الالاف مئات :طهران)

arrested by the Shah's regime. Some opposition leaders said that there could be no more compromise with the government.⁸⁷

A Brief Comparison of Narratives

Perhaps the most striking feature of the *Baghdad Observer's* narrative is that it never mentions Ayatollah Khomeini at all and rarely mentions the Shah. The only time the Shah is mentioned is in the context of the Japanese Prime Minister or in regards to the Shah's travel plans.⁸⁸ Rather, it focuses on government actors and the moderate and radical opposition movements. The paper rarely mentions the religious aspect of the demonstrations. In contrast, *An-Nahar* focuses on the religious aspects of the social movement almost reductively. The opposition is almost always called the religious opposition, and its leaders are almost always referred to as the religious opposition leaders. All distinctive aspects of the demonstrations, from the peaceful processions to the closing of the Tehran bazaar, are attributed to the religious leadership's decisions. The *Baghdad Observer* was the only journal to give a leadership role and agency to the bazaar class.

The Jerusalem Post's coverage was somewhat similar to *An-Nahar's* because they both used a significant number of articles from the Associated Press and Reuters. Despite this shared content, the narratives they presented had some important distinctions. *The Jerusalem Post* tended to highlight the anti-imperial aspects of the opposition movement and Khomeini's statements.⁸⁹ There was also more of an effort to contextualize the factors that contributed to the foment as it became increasingly apparent that the events were escalating.⁹⁰ The Iraqi paper

⁸⁷ (1978 أعمال ورجال سابقين مسؤولين باعتقال النعمة امتصتص تحول السلطات)

⁸⁸ (Reuter 1978)

⁸⁹ (Krimsky 1978)

⁹⁰ (Iran- minority Voice in the Islamic World 1978)

avoided handling the religious aspect of the movement while the Lebanese and Israeli journals downplayed the role of the bazaar class and emphasized the role of religious leaders, naming many of them. The potential reasons for this disparity will be explored after discussing the differences in coverage found with four other events.

The Camp David Negotiations

All three of the papers discussed in the paper dedicated large amounts of space to the three-way negotiations between Presidents Anwar El Sadat and Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Judging by depth and consistency, clearly this was perceived as the most significant event of the time period covered, but each journal covered the issue from a slightly different standpoint. These differences in coverage reveal more about the country's domestic politics than actual factual inconsistencies. In fact, all of the newspapers tended to agree on the hard facts; the difference is in their framing and the interpretation.

The paper with the clearest perspective was the *Baghdad Observer*. It consistently criticized all of the participants in the negotiations, and framed the issue as a betrayal of the Arab cause. It portrayed President Carter as being an Israeli partisan who was working to make sure Egypt made all the concessions while Israelis would receive all of its demands.⁹¹ In contrast, *The Jerusalem Post* insisted that Carter was pushing for both sides to make difficult compromises.⁹² The *Baghdad Observer* depicts President Sadat as betraying the Arab nation, and in particular, the Palestinians.⁹³ He is also accused of corruption and stealing from the Egyptian people.⁹⁴ One particular ad imitates a "wanted" flyer for a criminal and places him next to Prime Minister

⁹¹ (U.S. Pledges Support to Zionists 1978)

⁹² (Blitzer, Compromises mandatory at summit: Carter 1978)

⁹³ (Camp David Talks Opened 1978)

⁹⁴ (Wanted 1978)

Begin, who is accused of committing the massacre at Deir Yasin. The paper never uses the word Israeli, but rather prefers the term “Zionist”⁹⁵. To further impugn Sadat the periodical portrays him as a leader who can neither feed his poor country nor maintain their support.⁹⁶⁹⁷ In contrast, the Iraqi government is presented in a positive light, and the page opposite the article on Egypt’s economic strife is replete with articles touting Iraq’s economic development programs, which are centered around coordination with other Arab states.⁹⁸⁹⁹ The *Baghdad Observer* blatantly attempts to question Egypt’s claim to be the leader of Arabism, and attempts to establish itself as the true occupier of that role.¹⁰⁰¹⁰¹

The paper with the next most-apparent perspective is *The Jerusalem Post*, which presents the talks in an unequivocally positive light. The paper rarely goes into much detail about what the potential consequences of the negotiations are, but frequently talks about the benefits of normalizing relations with Egypt.¹⁰² Wolf Blitzer goes out of his way to extend platitudes to the Egyptian president complimenting him on everything from his healthy jaunt to his “handsome” pinstripe suit.¹⁰³ All of the headlines about the negotiations involve positive adjectives such as “warm,” “cordial,” or “friendly”. The Egyptian people, however, are portrayed as one of Sadat’s biggest barriers in the negotiations.¹⁰⁴ The portrayal of the negotiations and its participants are overwhelmingly positive, while Arab populaces are presented as obstacles.

The perspective of *An-Nahar* is slightly less apparent because it uses a significant number of articles from the Associated Press; despite this, the effects of its domestic concerns on the way

⁹⁵ (Zionist Jordanian Accord 1978)

⁹⁶ (Mhyiddin Opposes COnacts with Zionists 1978)

⁹⁷ (Problems of Over-Population in Egypt 1978)

⁹⁸ (Ahmed 1978)

⁹⁹ (Iraq’s Role in Arab Economic Integration Haild 1978)

¹⁰⁰ (Saddam Hussein Visits Armed Forces in Dohuk, Nineveh Gvernorates 1978)

¹⁰¹ (Saddam Hussein Receives Arab Delegates: Joint Arab Action Urged 1978)

¹⁰² (Landau 1978)

¹⁰³ (Blitzer, Adat: Can’t afford to fail at Camp David 1978)

¹⁰⁴ (Reuter 1978)

it frames the Camp David negotiations can still be seen. Unlike the Iraqi paper, the Lebanese paper almost never references an “Arab Nation” and rarely uses the term “Arab.” The most distinct characteristic of *An-Nahar* is that it constantly covers Syria’s posture towards the negotiations. It specifically covers its rejection of a separate peace. One emphasis unique to *An-Nahar* was the occasional emphasis on the fruitlessness of war.¹⁰⁵ While the paper seems to acknowledge that Lebanon’s internal and external struggles are inextricably linked to the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, it sees its interests as being distinct from those of Syria, Egypt and Palestine, and as such refuses to allow its struggle to be subsumed by the larger pan-Arab struggle.

While the Iraqi paper paints a dualistic picture of “us” Arabs versus “them” Zionist, and the Israeli paper does much the same with less vitriolic rhetoric, the Lebanese paper manages to navigate around these simple dichotomies presenting a more complicated picture.¹⁰⁶¹⁰⁷

Rebellion in Rhodesia

One of several populist rebellions that reached a crescendo during September of 1978 was the revolutionary movement of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. While *An-Nahar* gives scant coverage to this issue, both the *Baghdad Observer* and *The Jerusalem Post* covered it over a long period of time.

Again, the *Baghdad Observer* had the most simplistic portrayal of the events. The rebellion, which sought to end the rule of a white minority, was personified by Joshua Nkomo. Other black leaders were ignored or portrayed as collaborators.¹⁰⁸ All of Rhodesia’s white leaders

¹⁰⁵ (1978 مفصوحة كبيرة بة 1ك :دمشق للنتائج ومترقب منققد بين ديفيد وكمب العرب)

¹⁰⁶ (Arab press on summit: Negotiations 'delicate'; Hussein still won't join 1978)

¹⁰⁷ (Safadi 1978)

¹⁰⁸ (Nkomo Hopeful of Imminent Victory 1978)

(implicitly citizens as well) are given the label racist. Ian Smith, Rhodesia's white prime minister, is portrayed as a racist foil to Nkomo, an anti-colonial new man.¹⁰⁹ His at times unapologetic and indiscriminate violence seem heroic attempts at emancipation. The Baghdad Observer constructs a dualism that eliminates any moral ambiguity, and reduces an event that encompasses complex processes to a cartoonish rivalry.

A stark departure from this characterization is that of the *Jerusalem Post* which, while presenting a more nuanced interpretation of the events, portrays Rhodesia's white minority as victims and Ian Smith as a politician doing everything he can to appease a restive black majority.¹¹⁰¹¹¹ The *Jerusalem Post* explains how Prime Minister Smith is involved in a gradual process to transfer power over the course of two years and is working with black moderates to achieve that goal.¹¹²¹¹³ Nkomo and his forces are depicted as being brutal and impatient (one might even say savage).¹¹⁴ Though, given the tactics that he may have employed, this title may have been accurate.¹¹⁵ To *The Jerusalem Post's* credit when information regarding whether or not Nkomo's troops were responsible for massacring civilian passengers of a plane that they had downed,¹¹⁶ the paper retracted the statement until they received eye-witness accounts of the events.

Though *An-Nahar* did not have any articles that were directly on Rhodesia, it did print one article on an emerging trend towards resistance to dictatorships around the world, and dedicated a couple of paragraphs to Rhodesia. The paragraphs focused on how the Rhodesian

¹⁰⁹ (Nkomo Expects Fresh Racist Aggression 1978)

¹¹⁰ (30 blacks arrested in Rhodesia civil war 1978)

¹¹¹ (Zambia 'invites' Smith to come and meet openly with foes 1978)

¹¹² (Rhodesians can't meet deadline for black rule 1978)

¹¹³ (Rhodesia: A Lesson in Power Politics 1978)

¹¹⁴ (Air crash survivors tell of night of terror in the Rhodesian Bush 1978)

¹¹⁵ (10 Air crash survivors massacred in Rhodesia 1978)

¹¹⁶ (Pres 1978)

populace was splintered, and how Nkomo's success was predicated upon his having the ability to take refuge in neighboring countries.¹¹⁷ The portrayals of the conflict in Rhodesia are strikingly different, and as will be discussed later, reflect the ontological framework of these countries' domestic politics as much as it reflects the facts on the ground.

Sandinistas

All three of the papers covered the Sandinista movement with a great deal of interest. The division was very similar to the case of Rhodesia except with fewer appeals to brutality and victimhood in *The Jerusalem Post*,¹¹⁸ Also, in the *Baghdad Observer*, General Somoza was portrayed as a puppet of the US.¹¹⁹¹²⁰ While, both the Iraqi and the Israeli journals framed it essentially in a dualistic fashion, the Lebanese paper took a more fractured approach to the power dynamic, situating it within the dynamics of the Cold War,¹²¹ but also explaining how neighboring countries were beginning to get involved in order to avoid contagion.¹²²

The Lebanese Civil War

The civil strife in Lebanon was a case where portrayals were not so dualistic, and actually evolved in response to the actions taken by the parties involved. I did not analyze how *An-Nahar*, the Lebanese journal, covered its domestic politics for two reasons: 1) This chapter is primarily concerned with how foreign news is covered. 2) Perhaps the deciding factor, however, was that there were too many stories to effectively analyze. Despite this deficit, the

¹¹⁷ (نصار 1978)

¹¹⁸ (Nicaragua Students Pave Way For Insurrection 1978)

¹¹⁹ (Fierce Fighting Rages in Nacaraguan Cities 1978)

¹²⁰ (Heavy Fighting reported in Nicaragua 1978)

¹²¹ (نصار 1978)

¹²² (1978 جديدة مناطق الى يمتد التوتر نيكاراغوا في طائرة سقوط في العسكرية العمليات رئيس مقتل)

discrepancies in coverage between the Israeli and Iraqi newspapers were still significant and enlightening. As in the case of news coverage of Black Friday in Iran, the Iraqi newspaper tended to avoid religious signifiers, while the Israeli newspapers emphasized them.

The *Baghdad Observer* villainized “rightist militia groups” but never identifies their leaders or any other distinguishing characteristics.¹²³ Initially it described Syrian forces in Lebanon as “deterrent forces.”¹²⁴ This distinction provided legitimacy for their presence. As the weeks progressed and violence escalated, “deterrent forces” was dropped and “security” or “military” forces became increasingly used. This was particularly evident after Syrian forces attacked southeastern Beirut, using 2,000 heavy artillery shells in less than 12 hours.¹²⁵ The Israelis are portrayed as a threat waiting in the wings to intervene as almost every article on Lebanon ends with an Israeli plane flying overhead.¹²⁶ The Iraqi paper uses the threat of a further Israeli incursion to justify the Syrian presence in Lebanon.

The Jerusalem Post paints a completely different picture. It depicts a melee where Christians are on the defensive against Syrian “peace” keepers, Palestinian insurgents, and Lebanese Muslims.¹²⁷¹²⁸ It sees itself as potentially having to intervene in order to maintain security. While the Baghdad paper remained mildly neutral on the Syria issue, the Israelis present them as interlopers who overstayed their welcome and overstepped their UN mandate.¹²⁹ *The Jerusalem Post*’s stories give the impression that the Christian population is under threat and that the other Lebanese are complacent with regard to Palestinian Terrorist actions.

¹²³ (Rightists Shell Nabatiyeh 1978)

¹²⁴ (Rightist Concentrations in Bint Jubail 1978)

¹²⁵ (Nabatiyeh is Shelled Again 1978)

¹²⁶ (Israel overflies Beirut after Syrians again poid christians 1978)

¹²⁷ (Lebanese Premier says Syrians will stay as fighting intensifies 1978)

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ (To force Syrians out General strike called by Lebanon Christians 1978)

Common Themes and Frames

A media outlet has a given set of frames that it can employ the range of which is dependent upon its interests and the ontological framework with which it analyzes the world. This is not to say that the application of these frames is always, or even usually, deliberate. Rather, it often becomes a matter of habit to use traditional justifications when actual evidence is unavailable. The *Baghdad Observer* tended to resort to a dualistic view of the world that was anti-colonial, secular, and espoused a strong Arab nationalist sentiment. *The Jerusalem Post* tended to take a more defensive view of the world, showcasing victimhood and emphasizing religious and ethnic differences. *An-Nahar* tended to emphasize the role that international balance of power plays on politics and eschewed any rigid religious or ethnic causal relationships for conflicts.

An-Nahar used the most flexible ontological framework of the three, since it allowed for actors to pursue policies on the basis of procuring outside assistance. This fact caused there to be diversity in how conflicts were portrayed based on the geopolitical situation of the country where the event was taking place. It would seem as though the journalist at the paper applied its framework as best they could to the case of Iran. The idea of a religious nationalist movement was not completely foreign, and Musa Al-Sadr had been an active populist religious leader. Their ontological framework did lead them to over emphasize the role of religion and underestimate the role the bazaris played in the demonstrations.

The *Jerusalem Post* showed the most diverse coverage in terms of international news, and because it used a significant amount of articles from international new agencies, this coverage tended to seem balanced; they included multiple view-points and consulted sources from conflicting parties as well as impartial third parties. Despite this relative impartiality, the

ontological framework with which it views the world was revealed through the narrow and restrictive frame with which it interpreted the event in Rhodesia. In reading the article, “Rhodesia a lesson in power politics,” it seems apparent that the Israeli writer could not help but identify with the Rhodesian white minority that was losing control of its regime as he listed three major mistakes that the regime in Rhodesia had made: 1) losing US backing; 2) making concessions without any reciprocity; and finally 3) not responding strongly enough to violent attacks.¹³⁰ All three of these mistakes seem to be lessons that he wishes to teach other Israelis. It would appear that the power struggle in Rhodesia was perceived as a threat with direct bearing on Israel’s legitimacy, causing a visceral response in the article’s author.

In contrast, the events leading up to and following Black Friday were described with little vitriol and no particularly restrictive framing. It seems hard to believe that the journalists at a liberal Israeli media outlet would not perceive an Islamic movement as a threat. The significant number of articles they published explaining Shi’ite Islam and the conditions that led to the popular outburst seems to support the impression that they did not feel threatened by a Shi’ite Islamic regime. This lack of fear may have been due to hopes that an Iran controlled by a minority sect within Islam could act as counterpoise to Sunni-led regimes and secular Arab nationalism. It could also be that they did not view the demonstrations, though Islamic in nature, as seeking an Islamic government. If a threat had been perceived, however, it seems as though the reporting would have been more biased as in the case of Rhodesia.

In the *Baghdad Observer*, stories were typically portrayed with an easily-identified hero and an easily-identified villain. Both the cases of Rhodesia and Nicaragua show this tendency as Ian Smith and General Somoza were portrayed as villains, while Joshua Nkomo and the Sandinistas were anticolonial heroes. But again, this frame seems to have not been applied in the

¹³⁰ (Rhodesia: A Lesson in Power Politics 1978)

case of Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini or any number of opposition leaders could have made for good populist heroes, and yet the paper chose to ignore some of the movement's most salient features, and even took an ambivalent attitude toward the Shah's regime's repressive tactics. It would seem that the Iraqi newspaper could not figure out how to frame the story, so it did not try. Instead, it filtered out characters and events that might seem that could have resonated with the Iraqi populace such as the Shah and Khomeini. In deciding between a populist cleric and a secular dictator, the paper chose to avoid the issue. This particular type of ideological cleavage posed an impossible challenge for the ontological framework with which the paper traditionally worked.

Conclusion

The comparative analysis of this chapter shows how internal political dynamics can have an influence on how periodicals cover foreign events. In particular it revealed the ways in which a Lebanese periodical's coverage of civil unrest differed from periodicals from two other countries. It also provides a point of comparison for how Lebanese print media covers the current unrest in Syria.

Conclusion

In the conclusion to one of her articles, Sara El Richani (2013) talks about how the broadcasting landscape in Lebanon matches what Mouffe calls a “vibrant agnostic public space.”¹³¹ She writes this in response to Notzold’s assertion that television stations polarize and intensify conflict.¹³² My analysis seems to confirm a lot of what Notzold describes in her work: The broadcast stations talk past each other intensifying divergent perceptions of Lebanon’s political and social landscape. El Richani goes on to assert that in times of crisis this agnosticism can turn into antagonism. My analysis suggests that while this may be true during times of “internal” crisis, the looming collapse of the Syrian regime has to a certain extent encouraged a convergence in the way print media present the crisis.

The issue that Lebanon and its media present to the observer is the relationship between pluralism, integration, and democracy. Scholars and political observers commonly refer to Lebanon as being a failure. This evaluation is based on the idea that a proper democracy provides an arena for a “Habermasian universal rational consensus”¹³³. According to this ration, the continued disunity of confessional communities after 70 years of Lebanese independence is sign of a failure of the public sphere. El Richani tries to present this disunity as being a strength; it is an agnosticism that allows for discordant identities to live in the same geographic area under the same flag.

Though the idea of an agnostic public sphere is a more nuanced and less normative way of looking at the Lebanese media climate, it fails to fully explain the antagonism that is at times cannot be ignored. Zizek’s combination of Mouffe and Hegel provides a slightly more

¹³¹ (El Richani 2013, 78)

¹³² (Nötzold 2008, 128)

¹³³ (El Richani 2013, 78)

insightful way to look at the Lebanese media environment.¹³⁴ Looking at the antagonism as the externalization of Lebanon's religious communities' insecurity with their internal cohesion explains how El Richani's idea of the agnostic public sphere relates to my assertion that an aloof Syria provided stability by neutralizing internal conflict between conceptions of what Lebanon is. It also explains how an active Syria polarizes the public sphere and increases antagonism. The question now becomes how a fractured Syria will affect Lebanon.

My analysis of print media suggests that the violent conflict in Syria has the potential to solidify division between the Syrian and Lebanese identity. Both of the papers I examined began to use "Syrian People" with increased frequency as violence became more extreme. All of the news sources used democratic values in suggesting solutions to Syria's crisis and their domestic impasse. There was an increased sense that a solution to the crisis should be created by the Syrian people. Simultaneously, there were calls from multiple sources that Lebanese politics should not halt due to foreign problems.

Traditionally, Syria has been seen as a wedge issue that divides Lebanon's population along sectarian lines.¹³⁵¹³⁶¹³⁷ It is true that political cleavages seem to be determined by orientations towards the amount of influence that Syria should have. Most US media sources assume that instability in Syria will cause instability in Lebanon. My analysis seems to suggest that Lebanese instability is not a definite result of Syrian instability. The threat of uncertainty abroad seems to be encouraging tenuous attempts at cooperation in strengthening democratic processes that articulate the will of Lebanese people.

¹³⁴ (Zizek 2005, 63)

¹³⁵ (Chaitani 2007)

¹³⁶ (Moubayed 1999, 164)

¹³⁷ (Kurtulus 2009, 200)

My research points to areas that require further research. The data I collected from television news confirm Notzold's (2013) assertion that television stations tend to cover a certain confessional community with higher intensity than the other communities. This phenomenon leads to the question of what role television stations play in contributing to the character of Lebanon's public sphere. Do you they help conflict resolution by providing a space where communities get exposed to perspectives of people from other communities? Do they help perpetuate conflict by reinforcing intra-confessional solidarity and inter-confessional antagonism? The temporary convergence of *al-Mustaqbal* and *as-Safir*'s coverage suggests that media studies should look at the ways in which framing is affected by public opinion in addition to how it contributes to it.

Bibliography

- Abid, George. "'الخوف ربيع'". *as-Safir*, January 1, 2013: 3.
- Aday, Sean, Steven Livingston, and Maeve Herbert. "Embedding the Truth: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Objectivity and Television Coverage of the Iraq War." *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 2005: 3-21.
- Ahmed, Shehab. "Illiteracy Eradication - A Cultural Necessity." *Baghdad Observer*, September 8, 1978: 6.
- Ajour, Fayez. "الأزمة لحل دولية تسوية ملامح: 'السفير' ل'أوسي النائب'". *as-Safir*, January 4, 2013: 15.
- ak-Mustaqbal*. "الماضي الثاني تشرين في سوريا في أميركي صحافي عن الكشف". January 3, 2013: 16.
- al*Mustaqbal*. "جديد للبنان يؤسس الانتخابات قانون: فضلالله". January 5, 2013: 4.
- al-Din, Suleiman. "سياسية حلول عن البحث مغامرة". *as-Safir*, January 8, 2013: 1.
- al-Husri, Abu Khaldun Sati. *The Day of Maysalun: A Page from the Modern History of the Arabs*. Washington D.C.: The Goetz Company, 1966.
- al-Manar. *al-Akbar*. December 16, 2012.
- al-Masry, Mani. "الحسم عام 2013 عام". *as-Safir*, January 1, 2013: 19.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "الاجتماعية الشؤون وزير إجازات على عبثية 'بعثية' حملة". January 3, 2013: 4.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "صدمة". January 4, 2013: 3.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "الانتخابي الكسب .. 'موسم' في النازحين ضد تحركات يحضرون 'البرتقاليون'". January 5, 2013: 3.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "النازحين مع سينة تجاربنا: 'والإصلاح التغير'". January 4, 2013: 5.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "صيدا في سورية عائلة لألف مساعدات تقدم 'السعودية الحملة'". January 4, 2013: 7.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "النازحين الأطفال رزق مصدر البطاطا 'تعفير'". January 3, 2013: 7.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "سوريا كل إلى حلب من أسبوعية جريدة 'الحرية سوريا'". January 1, 2013: 14.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "'حزبالله' وضعف السوري النظام تفكك بسبب تراجعت إسرائيلي هجوم أي على الرد على إيران قدرة 'معاريف'". January 4, 2013: 14.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "حر سوريا نصف من أكثر: حمأة مجزرة على عام 31". February 3, 2013: 1.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "النازحين وجه في الحدود بإقفال يسمح لا الإنساني الوضع: إبراهيم". Januar 3, 2013: 5.
- al-Mustaqbal*. "الإنساني عملنا على يؤثر لن السوري السفير تمادي: فاعور أبو". January 3, 2013: 4.

- January 3, 2013: 1. *al-Mustaqbal*. "التواصل لجنة" اجتماعات لإفشال تستعد "الأكثرية" فاعور لأبو السوري السفير من جديدة اتهامات".
- January 5, 2013: 14. *al-Mustaqbal*. "هناك من الحرب ومواصلة العلويين منطقة الى اللجوء الأسد خيارات آخر".
- January 4, 2013: 14. *al-Mustaqbal*. "كيميائي هجوم أي لمواكبة المستشبيات وتعد سوريا مع الحدود على الجدار تعزز إسرائيل".
- January 3, 2013: 7. *al-Mustaqbal*. "بالكهرباء صعقا والموت القنص بين... التبانة باب أطفال".
- January 3, 2013: 7. *al-Mustaqbal*. "سوريا من الفلسطينيين النازحين إغاثة: "الأونروا" مركز أمام "حماس" لاعتصامات".
- January 1, 2013: 14. *al-Mustaqbal*. "مدنيون معظمهم 2012 في سوريا في قتل ألف 40 من أكثر".
- January 4, 2013: 1. *al-Mustaqbal*. "مسلحين بشبيحة النازحين "يفخخ" الأسد".
- January 4, 2013: 5. *al-Mustaqbal*. "أمنيا النازحين لمواكب: الجنوب في الفرعي الأمن".
- January 4, 2013: 4. *al-Mustaqbal*. "يعترضون وقتوش "التغيير" ووزراء النازحين الحماية إجراءات على توافق الحكومة".
- February 5, 2013: 1. *al-Mustaqbal*. "المعارضة مع التفاوض بالشرع يطالب الخاطيب".
- February 7, 2013: 1. *al-Mustaqbal*. "له ظهورنا إدارة لنا يبرر الأمن مجلس فشل: السعود".
- February 8, 2013: 1. *al-Mustaqbal*. "للتغيير السوري الشعب تطلعات تجمع الإسلامية القمة".
- January 5, 2013: 6. *al-Mustaqbal*. "الحدود لحماية دولية بقوات يطالب المرعي".
- February 6, 2013: 1. *al-Mustaqbal*. "نيويورك في مكاتب تفتح السورية المعارضة".
- January 1, 2013: 4. *al-Mustaqbal*. "السوري الصراع شرارة جنبتنا الحكومة: الموسوي".
- January 4, 2013: 4. *al-Mustaqbal*. "الإجرام سفير وأحقاد.. والجوع البرد أنياب بين النازحون".
- January 3, 2013: 5. *al-Mustaqbal*. "الأحمر بالشمع التركية الطيران مكاتب يقفلون اعزاز مخطوفي أهالي".
- January 1, 2013: 1. *al-mustaqbal*. "الاسد خروج على ينطوي أن بد لا حل أي: باريس".
- January 1, 2013: 13. *al-Mustaqbal*. "والكحروقات والسكن الأغذية التكاليف لافت صعود 83% إلى سوريا في السنوي التضخم معدل يرفع العقوبات تشديد".
- January 5, 2013: 1. *al-Mustaqbal*. "تركيا إلى "باتريوت" ال يرافقون أميركيون جنود".
- January 5, 2013: 14. *al-Mustaqbal*. "الحياة إلى العودة تحاول المدمرة حلب".
- January 4, 2013: 3. *al-Mustaqbal*. "وأخاتها "لو" وفرضيات... السيد خطاب".
- January 3, 2013: 18. *al-Mustaqbal*. "التاريخ مجرور تشكيل في مهما دورا تلعب تركيا: أوغلو داود".
- January 1, 2013: 16. *al-Mustaqbal*. "السورية الأزة في "اللئيمة السياسة" تلتخا القيصر عودة: 2012 روسيا".

12. January 1, 2013: "الحالية الحكومة سياسات استمرت اذا اقتصادية أزمة بداية 2013: الحس ريا". *al-Mustaqbal*.
11. January 3, 2013: "الصعبة؟ أيامنا في اليك نحتاج كم ..الصلح رياض". *al-Mustaqbal*.
2. January 4, 2013: "والسياسيين للنازحين السيئة النوايا سفير". *al-Mustaqbal*.
19. January 4, 2013: "المشتحيل السياسي الحل أمام سوريا". *al-Mustaqbal*.
2. January 5, 2013: "الصوملة" و "اللبننة" إلى "الشيشنة" من سوريا". *al-Mustaqbal*.
7. January 5, 2013: "اليها والنازحين عكار تحاصر الظهر إدارة حكونة سياسة". *al-Mustaqbal*.
16. January 3, 2013: "بالحجارة رجمهما قبل طعنا شخصين يعدمون الأسد شبيحة من عناصر يظهر فيديو شريط". *al-Mustaqbal*.
3. January 4, 2013: "إخراجهم على قادر السوري النظام أن التنبه عليه كان :صقر". *al-Mustaqbal*.
10. January 4, 2013: "ولبنانية سورية عملات وترويج لترويج عصابة ضبط". *al-Mustaqbal*.
16. January 3, 2013: "المليحة في بشعة مجزرة ترتكب الأسد بشار طائرات". *al-Mustaqbal*.
1. February 4, 2013: "الإسرائيلية الغارة على بالرد الأسد تكالب طهران". *al-Mustaqbal*.
1. January 5, 2013: "العربي للربيع الديمقراطي التأسيس عام". *al-Mustaqbal*.
4. January 3, 2013: "التطرف باحتضان لبنان اتهامه يجدد علي". *al-Mustaqbal*.
6. January 4, 2013: "صباطي على يغبر" أحد ولا يسقط الأسد :عون". *al-Mustaqbal*.
14. January 5, 2013: "ريفها في الأسد لقوت وتعزيزات دمشق محيط جوية غارات". *al-Mustaqbal*.
19. January 5, 2013: "الحدث دائرة في سوريا فلسطينيو". *al-Mustaqbal*.
7. January 4, 2013: "والبقاعيين النازحين تحتاج المعدية الأمراض ..النأي غيبوبة من ميقاتي استفاقة انتظار في". *al-Mustaqbal*.
3. January 5, 2013: "اللبنان - السورية الحدود على مخيمات بإقامة يطالب قبلان". *al-Mustaqbal*.
2. January 4, 2013: "السوري السفير تجاوزات وتستنكر الناحين مسؤولية الحكومة تحمل "المستقبل" كتلة". *al-Mustaqbal*.
7. January 3, 2013: "البقاع في سوري نازح ألف 300 :على - ميقاتي "إحفاء طاقية" تفضح لأرقام". *al-Mustaqbal*.
7. January 5, 2013: "شبيعا في للنازحين "الجمعية" من مازوت". *al-Mustaqbal*.
4. January 3, 2013: "السلسلة" تفوق النازحين مساعدة كلفة :مانجيان". *al-Mustaqbal*.
1. January 3, 2013: "دمشق في أسدية محرقة". *al-Mustaqbal*.
3. January 5, 2013: "القرى وأبناء ..النازحين لترويج "أسدية" مجموعا". *al-Mustaqbal*.
19. January 4, 2013: "الخليج غير ..آخر مكان في لبنان مشكلة". *al-Mustaqbal*.

- al-Mustaqbal. "الجوي القصف من الحد إلى يسعون والثوار مستمرة تفتناز معركة". January 4, 2013: 14.
- al-Mustaqbal. "النازحين آلان تخفي لا مضيئة بأيام الأمل مفرقات". January 3, 2013: 8.
- al-Mustaqbal. "النازحين ملف معه ويبحث السوري السفير يستدعي منصور". January 5, 2013: 3.
- al-Mustaqbal. "شمالا النازحون المجازر من هربا السنة ورأس الميلاد بين العائلات مئات". January 4, 2013: 7.
- al-Mustaqbal. "دولار مليون 19 تقدم وألمانيا النازحين ملف يتابع ميقاتي". January 4, 2013: 5.
- al-Mustaqbal. "وزارة أي على والتجني التحامل مقبولا ليس: ميقاتي". January 3, 2013: 4.
- al-Mustaqbal. "مباشرة إعرار في اللبنانيين خاطفي المحاورة الدولة يدعو نصرالله". January 4, 2013: 3.
- al-Mustaqbal. "إنفسه ويطالب... يعظ نصرالله". January 5, 2013: 5.
- al-Mustaqbal. "إهذا؟ لك أين من.. الثورة ستنا يا". January 1, 2013: 2.
- al-Mustaqbal. "لإسرائيب حماية الثوار تسليح يرفض أوباما". February 9, 2013: 1.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.
- An-Nihar. "المعارض ومويدي الجيش بين ايران اشتباكات في قتيلا 250". September 9, 1978: 1.
- An-Nihar. "لبنان في نزيها حكما سنستمر مصلحنا نريد... آخر أمرا نريد: ديفيد كمب عن الاسد". September 6, 1978: 1.
- An-Nihar. "لبنان نترك... اخرجوا وقايوا اللبنانيون اجتمع إذا اسرائيل تصيدته الميليشيات من جزء لبنان في الشغب يشيرا من: الاسد". September 10, 1978: 1.
- An-Nihar. "العاصمة فيها بما مدن 8 تشمل لسموزا المناهضة الحركة". September 12, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar. "أعمال ورجال سابقين مسؤولين باعقال النعمة امتصتص تحول السلطات". September 12, 1978: 1.
- An-Nihar. "فوكودو استقبال الشاه". September 8, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar. "مفصوحة كبيرة بة 1ك: دمشق للنتائج ومترقب منفقد بين ديفيد وكمب العرب". September 5, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar. "المسيرات منع قرار رغم على امس تظاهروا الالاف مئات الشاه تتحدى الايرانية المعارضة". September 8, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar. "معسكر على هجوم في شرطي مقتل للمناقش برنجه تقديم توجل والحكومة اليوم للمعارضة عام اضواب: ايران". september 7, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar. "والمفوضوين الشيو عيين" على حملة يكرر الشاه بين ال ورجال المعارضة صفوف في الاعتقالات من مزيد: ايران". September 13, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar. "شرطا ضابطا بينهم قتلى 8 سقوط الشارع على الدينية المعارضة سيطرة اكدت السلمية التظاهرة: ايران". September 6, 1978: 10.

- An-Nihar*. "ديفيد كمب في يتخذ قرار تأييد من "والصامتين المترددين" تحذر دمشق". september 9, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar*. "معارضة من 200 اعتقال يعلن نيكاراغوا رئيس". September 6, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar*. "ثالثا اسبوعا والثوار سموزا". September 8, 1978: 8.
- An-Nihar*. "الفنزيلي الرئيس يهاجم سموزا". September 7, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar*. "مايورك؟ دو بالما إلى ديالاجانت فرح العراق من الخميني بعودة وطالبوا تظاهروا الالاف مئات: طهران". September 5, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar*. "الغربية بالصفة احتفظت هي اذا ستتغيير الديمقراطية اسرائيل: كرايسكي". september 8, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar*. "دعمه مكدا بالشاه يتصل كارتز والمعارضة السلطة بين حوار في أمل لا". September 11, 1978: 1.
- An-Nihar*. "الدولار وهبوط ايراني النفط: امامي مع فوكودت محادثات". september 7, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar*. "جديدة مناطق الى يمتد التوتر نيكاراغوا في طائرة سقوط في العسكرية العمليات رئيس مقتل". September 10, 1978: 14.
- An-Nihar*. "حاسمة مرحلة في والحرب القتلى مءات: نيكاراغوا". September 11, 1978: 10.
- An-Nihar*. "ايران في حذر هدوء". September 10, 1978: 1.
- Artwick, Claudette Guzan. *Reporting and Producing for Digital Media*. Ames: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
- as-Safi*. "الأزمة لحل الأسد مبادرة ندعم: صالح". January 8, 2013: 14.
- as-Safir*. "إنسانيا النازحين قضية المعالجة "الديموقراطية"". January 8, 2013: 3.
- as-Safir*. "يحارب لن "حزب الله" و ضعفت وسوريا خطورة أقل إيران يتفكك "الشر محور": إسرائيل". January 4, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir*. "اليوم وغول ونجاد مرسي بين لقاء: الإسلامية القمة في السورية الأزمة". February 6, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir*. "الخطيب؟ مع الإيراني - الروسي الجليد بعد ماذا إتركي اعتراض: والحوار السورية الأزمة". February 4, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir*. "وواشنطن موسكو بين أفكار مع تتقاطع مبادرته أن يرى الأسد". January 9, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir*. "التغيير على عضي... السوري الرسمي الإعلام". January 4, 2013: 8.
- as-Safir*. "رسمي تعليم في خاص وضع.. السوريون التلامذة". January 1, 2013: 4.
- as-Safir*. "تتوقف لم المنابر لكن.. واحد بسطر يطير الوطني الحوار". January 8, 2013: 3.
- as-Safir*. "إورهانات انهيار: عام خلال التركية الخارجية السياسة". January 1, 2013: 11.
- as-Safir*. "جاد الحوار السورية والسلطة المعارضة تدعو الإسلامية القمة". February 5, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir*. "الأسد لخطاب تركي انتقاد". January 8, 2013: 14.

- as-Safir. "أولاً النار إطلاق بوقف يبدأ السوري الحل: يتبلور إيراني-تركي-مصري تفاهم." February 8, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir. "فقط للنازحين الخيس جلسة." January 1, 2013: 2.
- as-Safir. "الواقع عن منفصل الأسد خطاب: جنبلات." January 8, 2013: 2.
- as-Safir. "الهوم بمغادرة ينصحون والحلفاء..تصثعيدا يتوقعون الأسد خصوم." January 8, 2013: 2.
- as-Safir. "الأزمة لحل الدولي للتوافق أولية خطوات عن تتحدث دمشق." January 4, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir. "الجحيم؟ أم التسوية رهينة سوريا." January 1, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir. "والتسوية التدهور احتمالي بين 2013 في سوريا." January 1, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir. "دمشق؟ مع الأمنية القناة إعادة الرياض قررت لماذا." January 8, 2013: 2.
- as-Safir. "تؤيد والصين تدعمها وإيران تعلق لم روسيا بالرفض تقابل..للأسد وعسكرية سياسية مبادرة." January 8, 2013: 1.
- as-Safir. "الإغاثة جهود تسابق الفلسطينيين أعداد: بيروت مخيمات." January 1, 2013: 4.
- as-Safir. "النازحين إيواء إلى الحاجة تزايد: اللاجئين مفوضية." January 8, 2013: 7.
- as-Safir. "الصحية التوعية على تركيز: اللاجئين مفوضية." January 1, 2013: 4.
- as-Safir. "نفطنا لحماية وطنية إستراتيجية النضع: الإنساني البعد تغليب إلى يدعو نصر الله." January 4, 2013: 1.
- Associated Press. "Rival Moslem groups riot in Turkey." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 5, 1978: 4.
- Awadah, Wasif. "لبنانية مصلحة السورية التسوية." *as-Safir*, January 8, 2013: 2.
- Baghdad Observer. "3 Survived Plane Crash." September 5, 1978: 1.
- Baghdad Observer. "5 killed in Turkey." September 5, 1978: 5.
- Baghdad Observer. "Abrupt Fighting Flares up in Beirut." September 11, 1978: 1.
- Baghdad Observer. "American Law against Arab Boycott Denounced." September 12, 1978: 5.
- Baghdad Observer. "Camp David Talks Opened." September 7, 1978: 1.
- Baghdad Observer. "Carter Continues Hectic Contacts." September 9, 1978: 1.
- Baghdad Observer. "Demonstrators Attack Police Station in Teheran." September 7, 1978: 7.
- Baghdad Observer. "Demonstrators defy Iran's ban order." September 8, 1978: 1.
- Baghdad Observer. "Detentions in Iran over Discontent." September 12, 1978: 1.
- Baghdad Observer. "Devastating Floods Sweep India." September 5, 1978: 7.

Baghdad Observer. "Fierce Fighting Rages in Nacaraguan Cities." 12 9, 1978: 7.

Baghdad Observer. "Four Killed in Iran Clashes." September 5, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Fresh Fighting Flares in Beirut." September 7, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Fukuda Visits Iran." September 5, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Heavy Fighting reported in Nicaragua." September 11, 1978: 7.

Baghdad Observer. "Intense Fighting in Nicaragua." September 13, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Iran bans Public Processions." September 7, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Iraq's Role in Arab Economic Integration Haild." September 9, 1978: 4.

Baghdad Observer. "Mhyiddin Opposes COnacts with Zionists." September 9, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "More die in Clashes as martial law Clamps on Teheran." September 9, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Nabatiyeh is Shelled Again." September 13, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Nicaragua Students Pave Way For Insurrection." September 5, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Nkomo Expects Fresh Racist Aggression." September 8, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Nkomo Hopeful of Imminent Victory." September 12, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Problems of Over-Population in Egypt." September 9, 1978: 3.

Baghdad Observer. "Renewal of Fighting Breaks Fragile Truce." September 9, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Rightist Concentrations in Bint Jubail." September 5, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Rightists Shell Nabatiyeh." September 8, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Row in Iran's Parliament." September 11, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Sadat Arrives paris Amidst Tight Security." 9 5, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Saddam Hussein Receives Arab Delegates: Joint Arab Action Urged." September 11, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Saddam Hussein Visits Armed Forces in Dohuk, Nineveh Gvernorates." September 7, 1978: 1.

Baghdad Observer. "Somoza Threatens Strike Organizers." September 7, 1978: 7.

Baghdad Observer. "U.S. Pledges Support to Zionists." September 8, 1978: 1.

- Baghdad Observer*. "Wanted." September 5, 1978: 2.
- Baghdad Observer*. "Zionist Jordanian Accord." September 5, 1978: 1.
- Biloot, Mohammad. "الأسد خطاب على سفير"ل مناع هيثم". *as-Safir*, January 8, 2013: 13.
- Blitzer, Wolf. "Adat: Can't afford to fail at Camp David." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 6, 1978: 1.
- . "Compromises mandatory at summit: Carter." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 5, 1978: 1.
- Broman, Forest A. "Courting Disaster in Rhodesia." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 7, 1978: 8.
- Carragee, Kevin M, and Wim Roefs. "The Neglect of Power in Recent Framing Research." *Journal of Communication*, 2004: 214-233.
- Chaitani, Youssef. *Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon: The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Triumph of the State*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007.
- D'Angelo, Paul. "News framing as a Multiparadigmatic Research Program: A Response to Entman." *Journal of Communication*, 2002: 870-888.
- Dann, Uriel. *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955-1967*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Dimitrova, Daniela V, and Connolly-Ahern Colleen. "A tale of Two Wars: Framing Analysis of Online News sites in Coalition Countries and the Arab World During the Iraq War." *Howard Journal of Communication*, 2007: 153-168.
- El Richani, Sarah. "The Lebanese Broadcasting System: A Battle between Political Parallelism, Commercialization, and De-facto Liberalism." In *National Broadcasting and State Policy in Arab Countries*, by Tourya Guaaybess, 69-82. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.
- Entman, Robert M. "Framing Bias: Media in the Distribution of Power." *Journal of Communication*, 2007: 163-173.
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Gelvin, James L. *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- Golan, Guy. *International Media Communication in a Global Age*. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis, 2009.
- Goldstone, Jack. "Revolutions in History and the History of Revolutions." *Revue Francaise de sociologie*, n.d.
- Haddad, Wadi D. *Lebanon: The Politics of Revolving Doors*. Washington DC: Praeger, 1985.

- Halliday, Fred. *Nation and Religion in the Middle East*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000.
- Hamenlik, Cees J. "Information Imbalance Across the Globe." In *Questioning The Media: A Critical Introduction*, by John, Ali Mohammadi, and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi Downing. London: Sage Publications, 1995.
- Harris, William. *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1986.
- . *Lebanon: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Hayali, Hasan. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1918*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Heidar, Ziad. "المعركة ساحة في جديدا شيء لا: السورية الأزمة على عامان." *as-Safir*, January 1, 2013: 11.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond. *Agriculture and Reform in Syria*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011.
- . *Syria: Revolution From Above*. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Huweidi, Fahmy. "العرب؟ افتراق عام يكون هل." *as-Safir*, January 8, 2013: 19.
- Jakubowicz, Andrew. Media in Multicultural Nations. "Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction." In *Questioning the Media: A Critical Introduction*, by John, Ali Mohammadi, and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi Downing. London: Sage Publication, 1995.
- Jerusalem Post Reporter. "Terrorist said moving into S. Lebanon." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 7, 1978: 2.
- Jerusalem Post Staff. "Beirut 'sacks' Haddad, Shidiak." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 6, 1978: 2.
- Jorisch, Avi. "Al-Manar." *Middle East Quarterly*, 2004: 17-31.
- Jounblatt, Kamal. *I speak for Lebanon*. Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1982.
- Kalib, Sami. "المسلح السياسي الحل خطاب: الأسد." *as-Safir*, January 8, 2013: 13.
- Khalifa, Marlin. "سوري طائف" أو التقسيم: السوري للحل سيناريو هان." *as-Safir*, January 4, 2013: 2.
- Kraidy, Marwan. "Broadcasting Regulation and Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon." *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 1998.
- . *Reality Television and Arab Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Krimsky, Geroage A. "Shah Likely to keep throne- at a price." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 11, 1978: 4.
- Kurtulus, Ersun N. "'The Cedar Revolution': Lebanese Independence and the Question of Collective Self-Determination." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 2009: 195-214.

- Landau, David. "Three leaders hold joint talks as summit off to cordial start." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 7, 1978: 1.
- Lawson, Fred H. *Demystifying Syria*. London: Saqi, 2009.
- Lynch, Marc. *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
- Mackey, Sandra. *A House Divided*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989.
- . *A Mirror of the Arab World: Lebanon in Conflict*. New York: Norton, 2008.
- Mansour, Ahmed. "البناء وورش الأقبية برد في السوريون النازحون: الخروب إقليم." *as-Safir*, January 4, 2013: 6.
- Marmal, Imad. "علي توافقوا! الجمهورية لرئاسة مرشح أنا: شربل." *as-Safir*, January 4, 2013: 2.
- Maurice, Jack. "Sadat, on way to U.D., confers with Giscard." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 5, 1978: 1.
- Moubayed, Sami M. *The Politics of Damascus 1920-1946: Urban Notables and the French Mandate*. Damascus: Tlass House, 1999.
- MurrTelevision. *Prime Time News*. Beirut, December 16, 2012.
- Noakes, John A, and Karin Gwinn Wilkins. "Shifting Frames of the Palestinian Movement in US News." *Media, Culture and Society*, 2002: 649-671.
- Norton, Ricahrd. *Hezbollah*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
- Notzold, Katharina. *Defining the Nation?: Lebanese Television and Political Elites, 1990-2005*. Berlin: Frank and Timme, 2009.
- Nötzold, Katharina. "The Political Elites' Dominance over the Visual Space: A Qualitative and Quantitative Content Study of Lebanese Television." In *Arab Media: Power and Weakness*, by Kai Hafez, 125-144. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008.
- Nour al-Din, Mohammad. "إبأنقرة يمر التاريخ: أوغلو داوج." *as-Safir*, January 4, 2013: 15.
- Nowar, Maan Abu. *The Development of Trans-Jordan, 1929-1939: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*. Reading: Ithaca Press, 2006.
- PBS.org. "Muslim Brotherhood Candidate Scrambles Race in Egypt." April 3, 2012: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june12/egypt1_04-03.html.
- Pres, Reuter and Associated. "Nkomo: We downed plane, didn't kill survivors." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 6, 1978: 1.

- Ravi, Narasimhan. "Looking beyond Flawed Journalism: How National Interests, Patriotism, and Cultural Values Shaped the Coverage of the Iraq War." *The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 2005: 45-62.
- Reuter. "Cairo press: Israel must do all the compromising." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 7, 1978: 1.
- . "Confident Shah plans to visit E. Europe." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 6, 1978: 4.
- Safadi, Anan. "The Missing King." *The Jerusalem Post*, September 8, 1978: 16.
- Sakr, Naomi. *Arab Television Today*. New York: I.B. Tauris Co., 2007.
- Salibi, Kamal. *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*. Berkley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Schaffner, Brian F. *Winning with Words: The Origins and Impact of Political Framing*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2009.
- Schlesinger, Philip. *Media State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities*. London: Sage Publications, 1991.
- shalha, Abdelrahman. "النفطية المنشآت تحمي لاسرategic: النازحين بوجه الحدود إقبال يرفض نصرالله." *as-Safir*, January 4, 2013: 4.
- Smith, Lee. *The Strong Horse: Power Politics and the Clash of Arab Civilizations*. New York: Doubleday, 2010.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "10 Air crash survivors massacred in Rhodesia." September 5, 1978: 1.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "30 blacks arrested in Rhodesia civil war." September 12, 1978: 4.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "Air crash survivors tell of night of terror in the Rhodesian Bush." September 7, 1978: 4.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "Arab press on summit: Negotiations 'delicate'; Hussein still won't join." September 12, 1978: 2.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "Austrian official resigns because of Kreisky's remarks." September 7, 1978: 2.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "Bloody Clashes Continue." September 10, 1978: 1.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "Civil War in Nicaragua; martial law in two areas." September 12, 1978: 4.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "Five die in bloody Iran clashes." September 12, 1978: 1.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "Full-Scale attack by Nicaragua guerrillas." September 11, 1978: 1.
- The Jerusalem Post*. "IDF jets reported over Beirut, seen as warning." September 7, 1978: 2.

The Jerusalem Post. "'Insurrection' in Nicaragua." September 5, 1978: 4.

The Jerusalem Post. "Iran Bans Demonstrations." September 7, 1978: 1.

The Jerusalem Post. "Iran- minority Voice in the Islamic World." September 13, 1978: 5.

The Jerusalem Post. "Iran Violence continues as opposition walks out." September 11, 1978: 1.

The Jerusalem Post. "Iranians Say it with flowers." September 5, 1978: 4.

The Jerusalem Post. "Israel overflies Beirut after Syrians again poidn christians." September 11, 1978: 1.

The Jerusalem Post. "Lebanese Premier says Syrians will stay as fighting intensifies." September 10, 1978: 1.

The Jerusalem Post. "Martial Law Foiled Communist Plot." September 17, 1978: 7.

The Jerusalem Post. "New Iran gov't illegal, says opposition leader." September 13, 1978: 4.

The Jerusalem Post. "Rhodesia: A Lesson in Power Politics." September 14, 1978: 5.

The Jerusalem Post. "Rhodesians can't meet deadline for black rule." September 7, 1978: 1.

The Jerusalem Post. "Smith may mobilize all to avenge plane crash." September 10, 1978: 4.

The Jerusalem Post. "Syrians clash with militias in Beirut." September 6, 1978: 1.

The Jerusalem Post. "Syrians demand Lebanese try top Christians for treason." September 8, 1978: 1.

The Jerusalem Post. "Teheran shop strike spreads, demonstrators dispersed." September 15, 1978: 4.

The Jerusalem Post. "Tehran demonstrators defy ban." September 8, 1978: 1.

The Jerusalem Post. "To force Syrians out General strike called by Lebanon Christians." September 12, 1978: 1.

The Jerusalem Post. "Troops killed 'thousands' Iranian legislator charges." September 14, 1978: 2.

The Jerusalem Post. "Zambia 'invites' Smith to come and meet openly with foes." September 7, 1978: 4.

Wedeen, Lisa. *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Wright, Robin. "After Tahrir, Finishing the Revolution." *RobinWright.net*, January 21, 2012: <http://robinwrightblog.blogspot.com/>.

Zeine, Zeine N. *The Emergence of Arab Nationalism*. Delmar: Caravan Books, 1958.

Zizek, Slavoj. *Interrogating the Real*. New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005.

□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□□□: □□□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□□□
□□□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□□.september 6, 1978: 10.

الديكتاتورية غصون تكسر العصر ورياح نيكاراغوا يشعل الصحفي دم". هادي,نصار *An-Nihar*, September 10, 1978: 10.